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I. Introduction 
Guns have been a major part of Bill Johnson’s life ever since 
his grandfather taught him how to shoot as a child.1 Bill Johnson 
was nine years old when he first learned how to shoot a gun.2 At 
fourteen, his grandfather gave him his first shotgun.3 Three years 
later, the Marine Corps issued him a rifle.4 And for the past decade, 
Bill has carried a permitted concealed weapon.5 Now, as a 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Gun Rights and Foster Care Restrictions Collide 
in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/us/ 
michigan-gun-foster-care.html?mcubz=3 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (discussing 
Bill Johnson’s history of firearm use) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 2. See id. (noting Bill Johnson’s history with firearms). 
 3. See id. (“‘It’s a tradition,’ [Johnson] said. ‘My grandfather taught me, and 
my grandfather’s grandfather taught him.’”). 
 4. See id. (addressing Bill Johnson’s experience joining the military). 
 5. See id. (noting that Bill Johnson has a concealed carry permit issued by 
the state of Michigan). 
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grandfather himself, Bill’s ability to carry his gun and use it in 
self-defense may be in jeopardy.6  
In 2017, the Michigan Department of Health and Human 
Services (MDHHS) asked Bill Johnson and his wife, Jill, to become 
foster parents to their grandson.7 However, they allege, MDHHS 
told them “if you want to care for your grandson you will have to 
give up some of your constitutional rights.”8 Specifically, to comply 
with the MDHHS firearm restrictions, the Johnsons would have to 
give up their Second Amendment right to possess a 
“readily-available firearm[] for self-defense and defense of family.”9  
In Illinois, Kenneth and Colleen Shults have been foster 
parents for over a decade.10 They currently have a foster child in 
their home, along with their three biological children.11 Kenneth 
has a long history with firearms and is an “instructor at a youth 
firearms safety camp . . . focusing on safely handling and using 
weapons for all manner of shooting sports.”12 Colleen works for the 
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) as a nurse at Danville 
Correctional Center.13 In March of 2016, the IDOC sent Colleen a 
letter warning her that prisoners were using a people-locator to 
discover the addresses of IDOC staff, including nurses.14 The letter 
warned Colleen to “be careful and diligent for [her] safety.”15 
Unfortunately, as foster parents Kenneth and Colleen are 
prohibited from keeping a loaded, functional firearm in their 
home.16 They claim that they would “possess loaded and functional 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Johnson v. 
Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. July 17, 2017) (claiming that the MDHHS 
regulations on foster parents will impair Bill and Linda Johnson’s Second 
Amendment rights). 
 7. See id. at 4 (“The Johnsons were asked by the State of Michigan to be 
foster parents to their grandchild.”).  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 8. 
 10. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Shults v. 
Sheldon, No. 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill. July 12, 2016) (discussing the Shults’ current 
fostering of a child they are in the process of adopting). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. See id. (laying out the background of the plaintiff Colleen Shults). 
 14. See id. at 4 (describing the warning Colleen Shults received). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; see also ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., POL’Y GUIDE 
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firearms for self-defense” if not for the fear that they would lose 
their ability to foster children.17 
Michigan and Illinois—like all states except one—directly 
regulate the way foster parents store and handle firearms in their 
home.18 A vast majority place a burden on foster parents’ ability to 
access a functional firearm for the purpose of defending themselves 
in their home by requiring firearms to be stored in locked areas.19  
The regulations in question are directed specifically at foster 
parents or the foster home and do not mirror the state’s general 
regulations on firearms.20 Only one state, Massachusetts, has a 
generally applicable law that makes it unlawful to store a firearm 
unless that firearm is secured by a lock or in a locked container.21 
However, the statute allows the owner to carry a firearm on his 
person by explicitly declaring that action as outside of the 
                                                                                                     
2015.08, ENHANCED FIREARM SAFETY IN FOSTER FAMILY HOMES (2015) (requiring 
foster parents in Illinois to store firearms in a locked safe, disabled by a trigger 
lock, with ammunition stored in a separate, locked location). The policy guide 
cited in the complaint is no longer available on the department website. It is 
unclear whether they intended to do away with the policy by removing the guide. 
However, Illinois still requires that foster parents keep all firearms unloaded and 
locked up in a place inaccessible to children. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402.8 
(2018). 
 17. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Shults v. 
Sheldon, No. 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill. July 12, 2016) (stating that the Shults’ do 
not possess a functional firearm in their home because they fear the state will 
take away their foster children). 
 18. See infra Figure 1 (showing that Pennsylvania is the only state without 
a regulation or policy specifically addressing firearms in foster homes). 
 19. See infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (illustrating the number of 
states that require locked storage for firearms and separated ammunition); see 
also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (determining that a 
trigger lock requirement rendered firearms inoperable in the home for 
self-defense, making it unconstitutional). 
 20. Compare MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (placing restrictions 
on foster homes), with MICH. DEP’T OF ST. POLICE, MSP-203, USE AND STORAGE OF 
A FIREARM IN A HOME ENVIRONMENT 2, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
msp/msp-203_-_PDF_286476_7.pdf (recommending that firearms be safely stored 
in the home but not requiring it). 
 21. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (criminalizing storage of 
firearms without securing them in a locked location or with a locking device); see 
also Safe Storage, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-
laws/policy-areas/child-consumer-safety/safe-storage/#state (last visited Sept. 24, 
2018) (“Massachusetts is the only state that generally requires that all firearms 
be stored with a lock in place.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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definition of stored.22 There are some municipalities with similar 
requirements for locked storage, but each has an exception for 
firearms in the person’s control or possession.23 Only South 
Carolina explicitly allows for foster parents to carry a firearm on 
their person instead of keeping it in locked storage.24 Another three 
states have generally applicable storage requirements for 
individuals who reside with others who are not lawfully allowed to 
possess firearms, but still allow the firearm to be kept in the 
owner’s possession.25 Finally, many states impose criminal 
penalties on people who negligently or recklessly store a firearm 
where a child could gain access to it.26 However, none of these 
states impose these child access laws in a way that requires 
specific storage standards, allowing for sensible storage of operable 
firearms to use in self-defense.27  
                                                                                                     
 22. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (“[S]uch weapon shall not be 
deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or other 
lawfully authorized user.”). 
 23. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-312 (2018) (requiring firearms 
to be rendered inoperable with a safety locking device when not in the possession 
or control of the owner); OAKLAND, CAL. MUN. CODE § 9.39.040 (2018) (“Except 
when carried on his or her person, no person shall keep a firearm . . . in any 
residence unless the firearm is stored in a locked container, or . . . disabled with 
a trigger lock . . . .”). 
 24. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 114-550(H)(18) (2018) (“Firearms and any 
ammunition shall be kept in a locked storage container except when being legally 
carried upon the foster parent’s person; being used for educational, recreational, 
or defense of self or property purposes by the foster parent; or being cleaned by 
the foster parent.”); see also infra Figure 1 (compiling all of the state regulations 
and noting only one with an explicit exception for lawful uses of the firearm). 
 25. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.45 (McKinney 2018) (“No person who 
owns . . . [a] firearm who resides with an individual who . . . is prohibited from 
possessing a firearm . . . shall store or otherwise leave such . . . firearm out of his 
or her immediate possession . . . without having first securely locked such rifle, 
shotgun or firearm . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 25135 (West 2018) (requiring 
persons who own or reside in a residence with a person prohibited from owning, 
possessing, or receiving a firearm to keep any firearms in the residence in locked 
storage or on their person); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-37i (2018) (imposing similar 
restrictions on firearm storage in a residence with a prohibited person, but only 
for loaded firearms). 
 26. See Child Access Prevention, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., http://lawcenter. 
giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/child-consumer-safety/child-access-prevention 
/#state (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (describing all of the state laws related to 
prevention of child access to firearms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 27. See id. (noting that the only state with a storage requirement is 
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This Note does not address the constitutionality of these other 
regulations. These examples simply show that the burden states 
place on their general population is not nearly as excessive as the 
burden the regulations in question place on foster parents.28 Foster 
parents have been singled out as a group, and the regulations 
inhibit their ability to use their firearms in self-defense.29 This 
Note attempts to resolve whether regulations requiring the storage 
of firearms in locked containers and the locking of ammunition in 
a separate location in all foster homes violates foster parents’ 
Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms,”30 as defined in 
District of Columbia v. Heller.31 
To address this issue, Part II lays out the extent of the 
constitutional question by determining how many states regulate 
firearm storage in foster homes. Because a current compilation 
that describes these restrictions does not exist, this Note provides 
a survey of the state’s regulations to determine how many states 
may be affected by the answer to this question.32 Then, Part II 
presents the Michigan regulations as a case study representing the 
way a majority of states have chosen to regulate firearms in foster 
homes. Part III discusses the current status of the Second 
                                                                                                     
Massachusetts, whose storage law is generally applicable rather than confined to 
child access). 
 28. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (requiring people to 
store firearms in a locked location or with a trigger lock when not carried on the 
person), with MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be kept 
in locked storage or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate storage 
at all times in the home). 
 29. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (placing restrictions on 
foster homes); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) 
(determining that requirements that render firearms inoperable for the purpose 
of self-defense in the home conflict with the Second Amendment). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 31. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the Supreme Court’s task was to 
determine the constitutionality of District of Columbia ordinances that resulted 
in a ban on handguns and a requirement that all other guns in the home be 
disabled with trigger locks or disassembled at all times. Id. at 574–75. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right of the people to possess a firearm to use for lawful purposes, including 
self-defense in the home. Id. at 595, 635. Based on this interpretation, the 
Supreme Court held that both the handgun ban and trigger lock requirement 
violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 635. 
 32. See infra Figure 1 (compiling each state’s regulations or policies 
regarding firearms in foster homes). 
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Amendment following the most recent Supreme Court decisions 
and states why the regulations at issue burden the Second 
Amendment right. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court decisions 
further, as well as subsequent circuit court cases, to develop a test 
for determining the constitutionality of laws that impose a burden 
on the Second Amendment. Part V then applies that test to the 
storage requirements for foster homes and ultimately argues that 
requiring storage of firearms in a locked safe or cabinet is an 
unconstitutional burden on the rights of foster parents. 
II. State Regulation of Foster Parents’ Firearm Storage 
The current litigation in Illinois and Michigan could affect a 
substantial number of states.33 Forty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia (D.C.) have regulations specifically addressing 
firearms in foster homes.34 Forty-four states and D.C. require 
foster parents to store firearms in the home in locked cabinets or 
disable firearms with a trigger lock.35 Thirty-seven of those states 
and D.C. additionally require that ammunition is stored away from 
the firearms, with thirty states and D.C. requiring foster parents 
to lock the ammunition storage location.36 Finally, five states 
require disabling of firearms by a trigger lock in addition to 
keeping that firearm in locked storage.37 
                                                                                                     
 33. See supra Part I (discussing the litigation taking place in Illinois and 
Michigan). 
 34. See infra Figure 1 (compiling the regulations of each state and D.C. and 
showing that all but Pennsylvania have specific regulations for firearms in foster 
homes). 
 35. See, e.g., 016.15.2 ARK. CODE R. § 208 (LexisNexis 2018) (“All firearms 
shall be maintained in a secure, locked location or secured by a trigger lock.”); see 
also infra Figure 1 (recognizing each state that requires firearms be kept in some 
kind of locked storage or disabled from use, and citing the regulation in which 
this restriction is contained). 
 36. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-2.007(12)(c) (2018) (“All firearms 
must be stored unloaded. Firearms and ammunition shall be stored separately 
from each other within locked storage areas.”); see also infra Figure 1 (recognizing 
each state which requires that ammunition be stored separately from the 
firearms). 
 37. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R21-8-106 (2018) (“Firearms are unloaded, 
trigger locked, and kept in a tamper-proof, locked storage container made of 
unbreakable material; and . . . [a]mmunition is maintained in locked storage that 
is separate from firearms.”); see also infra Figure 1 (marking the four states which 
1646 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1639 (2018) 
It is not possible to focus on each of these states, so this Note 
looks in-depth at a single state that represents these common 
restrictions.38 The Michigan regulations currently being 
challenged under the Second Amendment39 are representative of 
the more common restrictions used throughout the different 
states.40 Therefore, this Note focuses on the Michigan regulations 
in its analysis but, due to the similarities with other regulations, 
comes to a more generally applicable conclusion.41 
In 2001, the Michigan Department of Health and Human 
Services (MDHHS) amended the rules listed in the Licensing Rules 
for Foster Family Homes and Foster Family Group Homes for 
Children.42 In the amendments, MDHHS created specific 
restrictions relating to the storage of firearms in foster homes.43 
The firearms must be “[s]tored in a locked metal or solid wood gun 
safe”44 or “[t]rigger-locked and stored without ammunition in a 
locked area.”45 Ammunition must be “stored in a separate locked 
location.”46 Handguns must also be registered, with the 
registration documents available for review.47 
                                                                                                     
require firearms be disabled by a trigger lock while in locked storage). 
 38. See infra Figure 1 (showing the most common restrictions placed on the 
storage of firearms in foster homes). 
 39. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing the claim brought 
by the Johnson family in Michigan). 
 40. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be kept 
in locked storage or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate storage); 
infra Figure 1 (compiling regulations of which a majority require locked storage 
of firearms with the ammunition stored in a separate, locked container). 
 41. See infra Figure 1 (illustrating that most of the states regulate through 
two common requirements). 
 42. See generally MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LICENSING RULES 
FOR FOSTER FAMILY HOMES AND FOSTER FAMILY GROUP HOMES FOR CHILDREN 
(2015), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/CWL-PUB-
10_502652_7.pdf; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 3, 
Johnson v. Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. Oct 6, 2017) [hereinafter 
Everytown Brief] (stating that MDHHS promulgated the firearm storage 
regulation at issue in 2001).  
 43. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (listing specific 
requirements relating to firearms in foster homes). 
 44. Id. r. 400.9415(3)(a). 
 45. Id. r. 400.9415(3)(b). 
 46. Id. r. 400.9415(3)(c). 
 47. See id. r. 400.9415(3)(d) (requiring registration documents be available 
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MDHHS had a significant interest it was trying to achieve 
when enacting these regulations. There is no collection of data 
describing the dangers of guns in foster homes specifically. 
However, Everytown for Gun Safety (Everytown), writing in 
support of a Motion to Dismiss filed by MDHHS, addressed the 
important interest in regulations such as those in Michigan by 
presenting statistics related to children and firearms in general.48 
In 2015, 565 children used a gun to commit suicide, the highest 
number since 1999.49 Suicide attempts involving guns are fatal 
90% of the time, resulting in guns accounting for 40% of adolescent 
suicides.50 This is significant when compared to the most common 
method of attempted suicide—overdose—which is fatal in 2% of 
attempts.51 The effectiveness of firearms over other methods of 
suicide is especially important because 90% of people who attempt 
suicide and survive will not attempt to commit suicide again.52 
This is important for gun storage laws because over 80% of child 
suicides by gun use a firearm from their own home.53 This suggests 
that even if youths still attempt suicide by another method because 
they lack access to a firearm, they will be less likely to succeed, and 
unlikely to try again. 
Firearms also pose a danger to children through both 
intentional and unintentional shootings.54 Prior to the 2001 
enactment of the MDHHS regulation, 22,661 children fourteen 
years old or younger suffered nonfatal injuries from firearms 
                                                                                                     
for inspection). The constitutionality of this requirement will not be analyzed in 
this Note. 
 48. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 3–9 (laying out statistics to show 
the danger that firearms pose to children). 
 49. See id. at 7 (“In 2015, 565 children and adolescents died by firearm 
suicide—the highest number . . . going back to 1999.”). 
 50. See id. (discussing the statistics about the use of guns in youth suicides). 
 51. See Matthew Miller et al., Suicide Mortality in the United States: The 
Importance of Attending to Method in Understanding Population-Level 
Disparities in the Burden of Suicide, 33 AM. REV. OF PUB. HEALTH 393, 397 (2012) 
(discussing the rates of successful suicide versus unsuccessful attempts based on 
method). 
 52. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 6 (“Ninety percent of people who 
survive a suicide attempt will not die as a result of suicide . . . .”). 
 53. See id. at 7 (“[O]ver 80% of children who die by firearm suicide used a 
gun from their own home.”). 
 54. See id. at 3 (discussing statistics relating to child victims of shootings). 
1648 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1639 (2018) 
between 1993 and 2000.55 Over 9,700 of those, or 43.1%, resulted 
from unintentional shootings.56 During that time, 5,542 children 
were killed by guns, with 1,146 of them resulting from 
unintentional shootings.57 This trend continues. In 2014, 
government statistics showed that sixty-nine children aged 
fourteen or younger were killed as a result of an unintentional 
discharge of a gun.58 Everytown states that an independent review 
concluded that at least 100 children were killed in unintentional 
shootings in 2013.59 
A study published in 2005 suggests that regulations such as 
those required by MDHHS reduce the risk of both suicides and 
unintentional injuries among adolescents and children younger 
than twenty.60 The study, which looked at children who 
intentionally or unintentionally shot themselves or 
unintentionally shot another person, revealed that “practices of 
keeping the reference firearm unloaded, locked, and the 
ammunition locked were all associated with significantly 
decreased risks of a shooting event.”61 In Michigan specifically, 
Everytown’s own study found forty-six cases of unintentional 
shootings committed by children under eighteen between the start 
of 2015 until the writing of the brief in October of 2017.62 
Everytown’s analysis concluded that forty-four of these could have 
been prevented by restrictions like those in the MDHHS 
                                                                                                     
 55. See id. (noting the number of “nonfatal firearms injuries” suffered by 
“children aged fourteen or younger”). 
 56. See id. (stating that 9,775 children suffered nonfatal injuries as the 
result of an unintentional shooting). 
 57. See id. (providing the statistics of child deaths by shooting in the United 
States between 1993 and 2000). 
 58. Id. at 4.  
 59. See id. (discussing a review conducted by Everytown that contradicted 
the data reported by the government relating to children killed in unintentional 
shootings). 
 60. See David C. Grossman et al., Gun Storage Practices and Risk of Youth 
Suicide and Unintentional Firearm Injuries, 293 JAMA 707, 708 (2005) 
(describing the method used to study the effects of gun storage on youth suicide 
and unintentional firearm injury rates). 
 61. Id. at 711. 
 62. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 5 (discussing their own database 
tracking publicly reported shootings unintentionally committed by children aged 
seventeen and younger). 
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regulations.63 These numbers reflect both a local concern for 
Michigan and a national concern that would likely interest each 
state that regulates in a similar fashion. 
III. The Conflict Between State Regulations and the Second 
Amendment 
The numbers above do not specifically reflect the impact on 
foster homes, and the data on whether foster children are at a 
higher risk of suicide in America is shaky at best.64 Also, looking 
at past injuries does not guarantee that restrictions could have 
prevented them. However, the numbers show that a problem exists 
with child injuries and death from firearms. In 2017, a child died 
every week on average from an accidental shooting.65 Additionally, 
Michigan has an increased interest in safety for foster children 
because they remain the responsibility of the state despite living 
in a private foster home.66 Nonetheless, having an interest in the 
safety of children does not necessarily allow the state to burden the 
rights of foster parents.67 The potential infringement of a 
constitutional right may outweigh the state’s interest, so an 
analysis of the Second Amendment right is required before the 
validity of the regulations can be assessed.68 
                                                                                                     
 63. See id. (stating that 96% of the shootings could have been prevented by 
safe storage laws). 
 64. See infra notes 425–426 and accompanying text (discussing the issues 
with studies claiming higher suicide rates among foster children versus children 
in traditional homes). 
 65. See Nick Penzenstadler et al., Added Agony: Justice is Haphazard After 
Kids’ Gun Deaths, USA TODAY (May 24, 2017, 3:04 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/05/24/justice-haphazard-when-kids-
die-in-gun-accidents/101568654/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (“Children under age 
12 die from gun accidents in the United States about once a week, on average.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.10(1)(c) (2018) (defining “foster care” as 
“24-hour substitute care for children placed away from their parents or guardians 
and for whom the state agency has placement and care responsibility” (emphasis 
added)).  
 67. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (noting that 
the existence of a constitutional right precludes consideration of certain options 
for combatting a problem). 
 68. See infra Parts III–IV (determining the proper test for whether the 
state’s interest may overcome the protection of the Second Amendment). 
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A. District of Columbia v. Heller 
Prior to 2008, the Supreme Court had never invalidated a 
regulation under the Second Amendment.69 In fact, the Supreme 
Court had not interpreted the Second Amendment since 1939, 
when the Court, in United States v. Miller,70 upheld a federal ban 
on transporting shotguns with shortened barrels in interstate 
commerce.71 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court did not 
overturn Miller, but it limited the prior decision to the specific 
restriction on short-barreled shotguns.72 The Court determined 
that Miller had not interpreted the meaning of the Second 
Amendment, thereby making Heller the main precedent.73  
Heller addressed two heavily debated issues regarding the 
Second Amendment that are relevant to the current inquiry.74 
First, the Court had to determine who the Second Amendment 
applied to.75 Prior to Heller, much of the debate over the meaning 
of the Amendment questioned whether the right to bear arms 
existed as an individual right unrelated to service in the militia.76 
The majority in Heller concluded that the Second Amendment’s 
invocation of a “right of the people” conveyed an individual right to 
each person, not a collective right attached to membership in a 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law, Policy, and Politics, 84 N.Y. ST. B.J., 
July–Aug. 2012, at 35, 37 (“[F]or the first time in history, a federal court 
overturned a gun regulation as a violation of the Second Amendment.”). 
 70. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 71. See id. at 178 (“[W]e cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees 
the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”). 
 72.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 622 (“Beyond [the type of weapon at issue], the 
opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right.”). 
 73. Id.; see also Spitzer, supra note 69, at 37 (“The decision did not overturn 
United States v. Miller . . . .”). 
 74. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (“Petitioners . . . believe that [the Second 
Amendment] protects only the right to possess . . . a firearm in connection with 
militia service. Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess 
a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm 
for . . . self-defense within the home.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 75. See id. (describing the debate over whether the Second Amendment 
established an individual right).  
 76. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 399 (2009) (claiming that the debate 
about the Second Amendment pre-Heller focused almost exclusively on the 
question of whether the right was an “individual” right).   
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militia.77 Second, the Court needed to determine the purpose 
behind the Second Amendment right to bear arms.78 The majority 
extensively analyzed the text and history of the Second 
Amendment to try to determine its purpose.79 The Court reasoned 
that the preservation of the militia was a plausible purpose for 
codifying the right.80 However, the court divided the Amendment 
into two distinct clauses, the prefatory and operative clauses.81 The 
majority did not interpret the prefatory clause language about the 
necessity of an armed militia as limiting the Amendment to the 
sole purpose of participation in the militia.82 The Court also 
identified self-defense as a primary purpose of the Second 
Amendment.83  
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago 
Because Heller addressed a law within a federal territory, the 
Court did not address the issue of whether the Second Amendment 
applies to the states.84 This question did not take long to come 
before the Court and was answered affirmatively two years later.85 
                                                                                                     
 77. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of 
both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right 
to keep and bear arms.”). 
 78. See id. at 581–91 (analyzing the substance of the right to determine the 
reason for its protection). 
 79. See id. at 599–600 (discussing the purpose of the Amendment and 
whether the prefatory clause limits it). 
 80. See id. at 599 (“It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was 
codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.”). 
 81. See id. at 577 (splitting the Amendment into a prefatory clause, stating 
a purpose of the right, and an operative clause, establishing the right that is not 
limited by the prefatory clause). 
 82. See id. at 599 (“The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the 
militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right . . . .”). 
 83. See id. at 630 (determining that the District’s restrictions stopped 
citizens from using firearms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense”). 
 84. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the 
Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 722 (2012) (discussing Heller’s 
focus on laws within the District of Columbia, a federal territory, leaving 
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment outside of the issues before the 
Court). 
 85. See id. at 722 (stating that a challenge to Chicago’s handgun ban was 
filed within fifteen minutes of the Heller decision’s announcement, which 
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In McDonald v. City of Chicago,86 the Court held that the Second 
Amendment was incorporated to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.87 Also, the Court decided that the right of 
the people to possess firearms for the purpose of self-defense in the 
home, as established in Heller, applies equally when incorporated 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.88 Consequently, state 
regulations will be held to the same standard as federal 
regulations when they touch on the fundamental right to bear 
arms.89 This is important for the central analysis of this Note 
because the regulations in question were all passed at the state 
level,90 and because the regulations mainly burden the ability of 
foster parents to use their firearms for self-defense.91 However, the 
Court did not make it clear how future courts should assess the 
validity of regulations that are potentially in conflict with the 
Second Amendment.92 The Court simply relied on the holding in 
Heller to invalidate the restriction once it determined that the 
Second Amendment applied to the states.93 
                                                                                                     
eventually found its way before the Supreme Court in McDonald). 
 86. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). McDonald involved a challenge to Chicago laws that 
amounted to a ban on handguns within the city. See id. at 750. The city municipal 
code required all handguns be registered, and also prohibited the registration of 
most handguns. Id. Petitioners challenged the ban under the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 752. The Court spent very little time on the 
question of the ban’s constitutionality. See id. at 791. The majority of the Court’s 
focus was on whether the Second Amendment is incorporated to the state’s under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 767–91. 
 87. See id. at 791 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”). 
 88. See id. at 787–88 (rejecting the dissent’s assertion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment stands on its own and requiring that the States be governed by a 
“single, neutral principle”).  
 89. See id. at 791 (determining that the Second Amendment “applies equally 
to the Federal Government and the States”). 
 90. See infra Figure 1 (citing each of the state regulations that may be at 
issue with the Second Amendment). 
 91. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the Johnson’s 
allegations that their Second Amendment rights are severely burdened by the 
Michigan regulations). 
 92. See Rostron, supra note 84, at 724 (“[T]he Court shed no new light on 
exactly how judges should go about sorting valid gun laws from invalid ones.”). 
 93. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (striking down the handgun ban based 
on the holding of Heller). 
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C. The Conflict Between Heller, McDonald, and the 
Michigan Regulation 
Michigan—like forty-three other states and the District of 
Columbia94—requires that firearms in the home be stored with a 
trigger lock or in a locked container.95 These regulations alone 
seem to neglect the Court’s ruling in Heller, in which the Court 
determined that requiring firearms to be trigger locked or 
rendered inoperable was an unconstitutional burden on the right 
to use firearms for self-defense.96 Regulations requiring trigger 
locks directly violate this ruling, and requiring the placement of 
firearms in a locked safe or container seems to place the same 
burden on accessing them for self-defense.97 On top of this, 
Michigan and thirty-six other states require that ammunition be 
kept separately, with thirty-one requiring ammunition be kept in 
a separate locked container.98 Some states even require that the 
separate containers have different keys.99 Finally, a couple states 
add a trigger lock requirement on top of the separate locked 
storage requirements.100 
Each of these regulations creates an added restriction on the 
ability of a foster parent to access their firearms in the case that 
they need to use them for the purpose of self-defense. However, 
                                                                                                     
 94. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting the number of states 
that require firearms to be kept in locked storage). 
 95. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring that 
firearms either be kept in locked storage or equipped with a trigger lock). 
 96. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (concluding 
that a trigger lock requirement is unconstitutional under the Second 
Amendment). 
 97. See id. at 635 (determining that a restriction which renders a firearm 
inoperable for the purpose of self-defense is unconstitutional). 
 98. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the widespread 
requirement that ammunition be stored separately); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 
400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring that foster parents store ammunition in a separate, 
locked container from any firearms). 
 99. See, e.g., UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 501-12-7(6)(c)(i) (2018) (“The locked 
storage for firearms and ammunition shall not be accessible through the same 
keys or combinations.”). 
 100. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R21-8-106(A)(2)(a) (2018) (“Firearms are 
unloaded, trigger locked, and kept in a tamper-proof, locked storage 
container . . . .”). 
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Heller dealt with a generally applicable regulation.101 The 
regulations in question apply to a single class of people—foster 
parents102—which could potentially take them out of the protection 
of the Second Amendment.103 This question is addressed below.104 
Also, the state has an added interest in the protection of youth in 
foster care because they remain the responsibility of the state 
despite living in a private residence.105 Part V addresses these 
issues to determine if the regulations can be reconciled with 
Heller’s interpretation of the Second Amendment.  
IV. The Current Standard for Analyzing Second Amendment 
Restrictions 
Now that the issue is defined, it is necessary to determine the 
proper way to resolve the problem. To do so, this Part analyzes the 
Supreme Court and circuit courts’ Second Amendment decisions.106  
A. The Lack of Guidance in Heller and McDonald 
With its recent decisions, the Supreme Court created more 
questions than it answered. Heller made clear that the Court 
intended “law-abiding, responsible citizens” to be within the 
protected sphere of the Second Amendment, and that right applies 
to the purpose of self-defense in the home.107 However, the Court 
                                                                                                     
101. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573 (describing the District of Columbia statute 
generally prohibiting the registration of handguns and requiring all residents 
keep their firearms rendered inoperable in the home). 
 102. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (regulating firearm 
storage in foster homes specifically). 
103. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (discussing the possibility of allowing for 
restrictions on firearms relating to certain classes of people). 
 104. See infra Part V.A (determining whether foster parents can be excluded 
under the Second Amendment). 
 105. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.10(1)(c) (2018) (defining foster care as 
“substitute care” of children for whom the state has “placement and care 
responsibility”). 
 106. See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing the categorical and balancing 
approaches, and then discussing the approach used by the circuit courts). 
 107. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (concluding 
that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right 
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”). 
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left room for certain longstanding restrictions to be presumed 
constitutional.108 The Court gave a non-exhaustive list of examples 
that would fall within that presumption.109 The examples can be 
sorted into five potential categories that may be restricted without 
offending the Second Amendment.110 These include: (1) possession 
by certain classes of people, such as felons;111 (2) possession in 
certain places, such as government buildings;112 (3) imposition of 
restrictions on the sale of firearms;113 (4) possession of certain 
types of firearms;114 and (5) storage of firearms for the prevention 
of accidents.115 Rather than expounding on what might fit into 
these categories, the Court left the exact interpretation of these 
permissible restrictions to future decisions as they come before the 
Court.116  
Also, the Court rejected rational basis review.117 The Court 
asserted that rational basis is the general standard set forth by the 
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. at 626 (noting that the opinion should not “cast doubt” on certain 
prohibitions that had been in existence long before the opinion). 
 109. See id. at 626–27 (mentioning restrictions on possession by felons and 
the mentally ill, possession on school or government property, and conditions on 
sales); id. at 627 n.26 (“[O]ur list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). 
 110. See id. at 626–27 (giving examples of potentially valid restrictions). 
 111. See id. (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill . . . .”). 
 112. See id. (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . .”). 
 113. See id. (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on . . . laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.”).  
 114. See id. at 627 (“[T]he sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common 
use at the time.’”). 
 115. See id. at 632 (“Nor, correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the 
invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”). 
 116. See id. at 635 (responding to the dissent’s argument that the majority 
left so many applications in doubt without justification by stating the Court will 
expound upon those issues “if and when those exceptions come before us”); see 
also Blocher, supra note 76, at 433 (“But Heller failed to identify its underlying 
values, making it difficult for future courts to recognize any lineal descendants of 
the original categories ascertained by the Court in Heller.”). 
 117. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) 
(rejecting rational basis review as the proper standard of analysis). Under 
rational basis review, a state action does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause if it “rationally furthers the purpose identified by the 
State.” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). 
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Constitution to protect the people from “irrational laws.”118 It 
would be redundant to enumerate a right which is given the same 
standard of review that all laws must pass under the 
Constitution.119 This would give the enumeration of the right “no 
effect” because the laws against it would be subject to the same 
test if the right were not enumerated.120 Therefore, the Second 
Amendment’s existence implies that it deserves a higher standard 
of review.121 However, the Court failed to define the proper level of 
scrutiny that the Second Amendment should be afforded.122  
Some experts suggest that the Court hoped to pull the Second 
Amendment out of the normal scrutiny analysis.123 This conclusion 
is supported by the Court’s refusal to choose a level of scrutiny to 
apply to the analysis.124 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejected 
Justice Breyer’s attempt to establish an interest-balancing 
approach that does not specifically propose any of the traditional 
levels of scrutiny.125 Scalia wrote that he “[knew] of no other 
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”126 While 
this statement was not in response to the proposal of a traditional 
scrutiny analysis, each level of scrutiny applies its own test that 
                                                                                                     
 118. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of 
analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that 
are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.”). 
 119. See id. (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear 
arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the 
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws.”). 
 120. See id. (stating that rational basis would give the Second Amendment 
“no effect”). 
 121. See id. (stating that the use of rational basis review would mean that the 
Second Amendment has no effect). 
 122. See Rostron, supra note 84, at 716 (addressing the failure of the Court to 
provide a proper standard for analyzing the Second Amendment). 
 123. See id. (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ questioning of the need to apply 
the conventional tiers of analysis to the Second Amendment); Blocher, supra note 
76, at 405 (noting that the Heller majority used an approach that was categorical 
in nature). 
 124. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (noting that the dissent criticizes the majority 
for failing to establish a proper level of scrutiny to apply to regulations that 
implicate the Second Amendment). 
 125. See id. at 634–35 (justifying the majority’s refusal to adopt an 
interest-balancing approach in their analysis in response to the dissent’s 
criticism). 
 126. Id. at 634. 
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pins the interests of the right against the purpose behind the 
regulation.127 
The Court justified its denial of the interest-balancing 
approach with the argument that longstanding regulations—those 
restrictions on firearms in place when the Second Amendment was 
ratified—were the product of interest-balancing by the Founders 
who wrote the Amendment.128 The balancing has already been 
done, and it is not the job of future legislatures and courts to redo 
it based on their own personal interests.129 This reasoning supports 
a pure category-based approach—only withholding Second 
Amendment protection from the categories that were determined 
to be justified at the time of solidifying the right in the 
Constitution.130 A scrutiny approach would still allow for a 
revisiting of those interests later, just with a pre-established 
threshold that must be met to justify a regulation. Either way, the 
Court felt that the question was meaningless in Heller because the 
restrictions in question were unconstitutional under any possible 
scrutiny analysis.131 Because of this, Heller did not establish a 
proper test to employ in the future, and left room for further 
analysis. 
Additionally, during oral arguments in Heller, Chief Justice 
Roberts specifically questioned the need to subject the regulations 
at hand to a standard of review.132 Specifically, he stated that 
                                                                                                     
 127. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (2009) (describing the 
different levels of scrutiny applied in cases involving potential violations of equal 
protection or fundamental rights). Each standard of scrutiny involves some level 
of weighing the government’s interest in the law versus a standard set by the 
court. See id. This test is seemingly its own form of balancing the government’s 
interest against the interest in the fundamental right. 
 128. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“Like the 
First, [the Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest balancing by the 
people.”). 
 129. See id. at 634–35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope 
they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not 
future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”). 
 130. See id. at 626–27 (giving examples of potentially valid restrictions based 
on their status as “longstanding prohibitions”). 
 131. See id. at 628 (stating that the restrictions would not survive “[u]nder 
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights”). 
 132. See Rostron, supra note 84, at 716 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ 
questioning at oral arguments in Heller explains the failure to identify a test). 
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“these various phrases under the different standards that are 
proposed, ‘compelling interest,’ ‘significant interest,’ ‘narrowly 
tailored,’ none of them appear in the Constitution; and [he] 
wonder[s] why in this case [the Court] ha[s] to articulate an 
all-encompassing standard.”133 This, in itself, is not dispositive of 
a desire to completely abandon any scrutiny analysis, because it 
referred only to establishing an “all-encompassing standard” in an 
analysis of a single regulation and not to establishing a standard 
in any Second Amendment review.134 The Chief Justice’s 
statement left room for adoption of scrutiny standards in future 
cases without establishing one that must be used in every Second 
Amendment analysis, because Heller merely declined to choose 
rather than explicitly abandoning the possibility.135 Therefore, a 
scrutiny analysis may still be within the reading of the Second 
Amendment employed by Heller. 
McDonald was the Supreme Court’s next chance to clear up 
the confusion in the aftermath of Heller.136 The Court was faced 
with determining the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance that 
made it illegal to possess a firearm in the home without a valid 
registration.137 Coupled with another ordinance prohibiting the 
registration of most handguns, the practical effect is essentially a 
ban on handguns.138 This restriction is almost identical to the D.C. 
restriction analyzed in Heller.139 While Justice Alito took the time 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290)). 
 134. See id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290)) (questioning the need “in this case” to 
establish an “all-encompassing standard”) (emphasis added)). 
 135. See id. (stating that the court “declined to specify exactly whether strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or some other standard should be used”). 
 136. See id. at 707 (describing McDonald as the Supreme Court’s “second 
skirmish” in the Second Amendment conflict). 
 137. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (“A City 
ordinance provides that ‘[n]o person shall . . . possess . . . any firearm unless such 
person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm.’” (quoting 
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040(a) (2009))). 
 138. See id. (“The Code then prohibits registration of most handguns, thus 
effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside 
in the City.”). 
 139. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008) (“The 
District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime 
to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is 
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to write an incredibly in-depth and well researched argument 
spanning over forty pages, the opinion focuses purely on the issue 
of incorporation to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.140 
The question of the ordinance’s constitutionality is given one 
paragraph of consideration.141 Concluding that “a provision of the 
Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an 
American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government 
and the States,”142 the majority struck down the ordinance purely 
under the justification that such a restriction was held to be 
unconstitutional in Heller.143 Since McDonald, the Supreme Court 
has not further answered the question.144 While it is clear that 
bans on handgun possession in the home are unconstitutional,145 
the Second Amendment remains without a clear test following 
McDonald. Luckily, the circuit courts have begun to take matters 
into their own hands. 
Regardless of the majority’s actual desire in Heller, the circuit 
courts have not adopted a strict categorical approach.146 Many 
circuits begin by using a categorical approach to determine if the 
class of people, type of weapon, or method of restriction at issue are 
intended to receive protection under the Second Amendment.147 If 
                                                                                                     
prohibited.”). 
 140. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 748–91 (discussing the incorporation of the 
Second Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment for almost 
all of the majority opinion). 
 141. See id. at 791 (using the holding in Heller to quickly determine that the 
Chicago ordinance is unconstitutional based on identical application of the Second 
Amendment to the federal government and the states).  
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. (“In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the 
right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.”).  
 144. The Court did take one more Second Amendment case, but in a short per 
curiam opinion it struck down a ban on stun guns under Heller without further 
analysis. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (per curiam). 
 145. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that the District’s ban on handguns 
in the home is in violation of the Second Amendment); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 
(following the precedent set by Heller that the Second Amendment protects the 
right to possession of a handgun for self-defense in the home). 
 146. See infra Part IV.B.2 (analyzing the approach taken by many of the 
circuits in determining the constitutionality of restrictions under the Second 
Amendment). 
 147. See, e.g., Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (testing first whether the prohibition “falls within the historical scope 
of the Second Amendment”). 
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the Second Amendment’s protection applies, the court employs a 
sliding scale of strict and intermediate scrutiny to determine the 
constitutionality of the restriction in question.148 The issues with 
the strict categorical approach justify the use of the test employed 
by the circuit courts, as will be shown in Part IV.B. 
B. Application of Heller to New Regulations 
Heller left many questions that need to be answered before 
new regulations can be analyzed under the Second Amendment.149 
To answer these questions and develop a test to apply to new 
regulations, the categorical and balancing approaches discussed in 
Heller are examined, and then the analysis used by the circuit 
courts is explained.150 Then, a proper test to evaluate the MDHHS 
regulations is chosen.151 
1. Assessing Regulations Through Categorical Exclusions Versus 
a General Balancing Test 
Joseph Blocher, a Constitutional Law Professor at Duke 
University School of Law who focuses on the First and Second 
Amendments, notes that Heller presents a fight between two 
possible approaches to Second Amendment challenges.152 The 
majority pushed for a categorical approach after determining that 
a balancing approach would open up the Second Amendment to 
future judgments as to whether the Amendment’s protections 
continue to be useful.153 The majority posits that a constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 148. See, e.g., id. at 961 (testing the restriction’s impact on the core of the 
right, and the extent of the burden on the right, in determining the level of 
scrutiny to apply). 
 149. See supra Part IV.A (describing the issues with Heller’s analysis of the 
Second Amendment). 
 150. Infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2. 
 151. See infra Part IV.B.2 (concluding that the circuit court test is proper for 
this analysis). 
 152. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 379–80 (describing two potential 
approaches to the analysis of Second Amendment conflicts following Heller).  
 153. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) 
(mentioning that a balancing approach would subject the Second Amendment to 
“future judges’ assessments of its usefulness”). 
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guarantee subject to such review in the future is “no constitutional 
guarantee at all.”154 In dissent, Justice Breyer stressed the need 
for a defined balancing standard, arguing that self-defense is not 
dispositive of unconstitutionality, but it merely “raises questions 
about the law’s constitutionality.”155 Historical evidence suggests 
that the practicalities and rationales behind each law must be 
considered before declaring it unconstitutional.156 While the 
majority desired to preserve the strength of the Amendment by 
avoiding a balancing approach, there are issues with developing a 
purely categorical approach following Heller.157 This Part argues 
that the categorical approach should be bolstered by a balancing 
test in a two-step process.158 
a. The Categorical Approach 
The categorical approach draws a predetermined line between 
those categories that are protected by the Second Amendment and 
those that fall outside of the Amendment’s scope, making 
membership in a certain category outcome-determinative.159 Such 
an approach allows for the outcome to be determined at the outset 
of the litigation based on the right and the mode in which it is 
infringed.160 The benefit of categorization is that it conforms to 
rules.161 Once the category is formed, it governs all subsequent 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. at 634. 
 155. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
 156. Id. (“[T]o answer the questions that are raised . . . requires us to focus on 
practicalities, the statute’s rationale, the problems that called it into being, [and] 
its relation to those objectives . . . .”). 
 157. See infra Part IV.B.1.a (conducting a deeper analysis of the categorical 
approach and the issues that arise in trying to apply it following Heller). 
 158. See infra Part IV.B.2 (recommending a two-step approach to analyzing 
restrictions that conflict with the Second Amendment). 
 159. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 405 (addressing the categorical approach’s 
exclusion of certain categories, such as felons and types of arms, from Second 
Amendment protection). 
 160. See id. at 382 (stating that categoricalism allows cases to be governed 
without any further reference to the background values); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 293, 294–96 (1992) (discussing the benefits of the consistency of a categorical 
approach). 
 161. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 382 (noting that categoricalism allows 
judges to create a rule that will bind in future cases); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The 
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cases, and stops future judges from reweighing the values and 
interests in any individual case.162  
There are issues with the Court’s attempt to establish a 
categorical framework for the Second Amendment.163 The Heller 
majority compared the Second Amendment to the First 
Amendment by positing that an interest balancing test had been 
done at the time of the Second Amendment’s creation by the 
people, and that the extent of its protection from that time should 
remain stable.164 The majority asserts that the dissent’s balancing 
approach would simply allow courts to reweigh interests that were 
already considered, allowing future judges to change the scope of 
the Amendment.165 However, the First Amendment has previously 
been opened up to a balancing of interests that changes the scope 
of its coverage at different times in history.166 
There are also issues with the examples Heller presents. First, 
the majority suggests the categorical exclusion of two groups—
felons and the mentally ill—from the Second Amendment’s 
coverage.167 The majority never purports to justify such an 
exclusion.168 The analysis undercuts the Court’s use of the First 
and Fourth Amendments as justification for categorical exclusions, 
because those Amendments do not restrict any subsets of people, 
                                                                                                     
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 59 (1992) (“Categorization 
corresponds to rules, balancing to standards.”). 
 162. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 382 (“[C]ategoricalism allows a judge to 
transform some background value into a rule that will govern all subsequent 
cases inside the category.”). 
 163. See id. at 405–30 (noting that there are issues in Heller’s category 
examples). 
 164. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“Like the First 
[Amendment], [the Second] is the very product of an interest balancing by the 
people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew.”). 
 165. See id. at 634–35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope 
they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not 
future legislatures or . . . judges think that scope too broad.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (determining 
that speech may be protected in one situation but not in another, because “the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done”). 
 167. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to 
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill . . . .”). 
 168. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 414 (describing it as unclear why these 
groups should be excluded). 
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including felons, from their protections.169 It is unclear how to 
determine what groups can be excluded from coverage. Heller’s 
only other potential guidance comes from the label of 
presumptively constitutional exclusions as “longstanding,”170 and 
explicitly extending the Second Amendment’s protection to 
“law-abiding, responsible citizens.”171 Domestic violence 
misdemeanants and undocumented immigrants have been 
excluded from protection without Heller’s explicit approval.172 
However, laws restricting immigrants and domestic violence 
misdemeanants from possessing firearms do not meet the 
longstanding requirement.173 Therefore, either falling outside of 
the “law-abiding, responsible citizens”174 language alone is 
sufficient or a balancing test is necessary to allow for more 
restrictions outside of those categories excluded from protection. 
Because Heller specifically aimed its exclusions at longstanding 
restrictions,175 and to not require this would lead to more 
confusion, adopting a balancing approach better justifies 
validating more recent laws. 
                                                                                                     
 169. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the 
majority’s argument for using the First and Fourth Amendments to define “the 
people” and then hinting at groups excluded from Second Amendment protection 
who are not restricted under the First and Fourth Amendments). 
 170. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 171. Id. at 635. 
 172. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (criminalizing possession of a firearm by 
different groups, including undocumented immigrants and domestic violence 
misdemeanants). The confusion in interpretation has led to a circuit split on 
whether undocumented immigrants are excluded from the Second Amendment’s 
protection. See D. McNair Nichols, Note, Guns and Alienage: Correcting a 
Dangerous Contradiction, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2089, 2101–02 (2016). There 
are also disagreements among the circuit courts about whether domestic violence 
misdemeanants are excluded from coverage. See infra notes 207–212 and 
accompanying text. 
 173. See Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 205 (6th Cir. 2018) (determining 
that prohibitions on domestic violence misdemeanant’s possession of firearms are 
twentieth-century restrictions); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (noting the lack of historical gun restrictions on domestic violence 
misdemeanants).  
 174. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 175. See id. at 626 (specifically noting “longstanding prohibitions” as those 
which should not have doubt cast on them). 
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Second, Heller attempted to pave the way for the enactment of 
certain safe storage laws to prevent gun accidents.176 However, the 
Court proceeded to invalidate a law aimed directly at the safe 
storage of firearms.177 D.C. imposed a restriction that firearms in 
the home must be “unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger 
lock or similar device.”178 The Court invalidated this law on the 
basis that it did not explicitly allow for self-defense, nor could a 
self-defense exception be read in.179 The restrictions on foster 
parents are regulations on storage similar to D.C.’s.180 In turn, the 
Court’s failure to acknowledge the true existence of such a category 
makes an analysis difficult under a solely categorical approach. 
Finally, the Court acknowledges the constitutionality of 
certain laws “forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places.”181 The two examples given are “schools and government 
buildings.”182 However, Heller’s holding only extends to the private 
home. Both examples given are places outside of this holding.183 
Should these examples be read to extend the Second Amendment 
outside of the home? Or should this exception be read to allow 
restrictions in private homes when they can be considered a 
sensitive place? Foster homes are private homes within the Second 
Amendment’s protection—but are also arguably a “sensitive 
place”184—so it is unclear whether they can be excluded as a 
category under Heller. All of these issues justify strengthening the 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. at 632 (“Nor, correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the 
invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”). 
 177. See id. at 630 (invalidating a safe-storage requirement). 
 178. Id. at 575. 
 179. See id. at 630 (stating that the law made it impossible for citizens to use 
firearms for self-defense and explaining why an exception could not be read in). 
 180. Compare id. at 574 (“District of Columbia law . . . requires residents to 
keep their lawfully owned firearms . . . ‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a 
trigger lock or similar device’ unless they are . . . being used for lawful recreational 
activities.”), with MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be 
kept in locked storage or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate 
storage). 
 181. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 635 (holding the ban on “handgun possession in the home” and 
prohibition against rendering firearms operable “in the home” unconstitutional) 
(emphasis added). 
 184. Id. at 626. 
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categorical approach with a balancing test to ease the confusion 
left by Heller. 
b. The Balancing Approach  
The balancing approach consists of weighing the individual 
interest in the Second Amendment right against the Government’s 
interest in regulating that right.185 Balancing opens up 
decision-making to the application of principles and policy to the 
facts of a case, which risks a factual influence that a categorical 
approach does not allow.186 Balancing generally leads to the 
application of a certain level of scrutiny, which may vary 
depending on the type of restriction.187 Justice Breyer, in dissent, 
encouraged the use of a test that asks “whether the statute 
imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s 
legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.”188 Breyer analyzed the 
empirical arguments presented by Heller and asserted that the 
Court must ask if these arguments are “strong enough to destroy 
judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a legislature that 
rejects them.”189 Breyer defends the use of balancing over a strict 
categorical approach because different areas may have different 
interests in restrictions. He cites the difference in incidents of gun 
crime between urban and rural areas, an issue that an originalist 
categorical approach cannot seemingly address.190 The method the 
circuit courts use combines these two approaches and stays true to 
Heller’s exclusions while filling in the holes the Court left. 
                                                                                                     
 185. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 381 (defining the balancing approach). 
 186. See id. (discussing how balancing involves the application of a principle 
to facts, while categorization requires a determinative response); Sullivan, supra 
note 161, at 58–59 (comparing balancing and categorization based on rules versus 
standards). 
 187. See, e.g., Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960–61 
(9th Cir. 2014) (discussing the test for selecting an appropriate level of scrutiny). 
 188. Heller, 554 U.S. at 693 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 702 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 190. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 412 (noting that Justice Breyer, following 
his description of a balancing test, recognized the special interest of urban areas 
with gun issues); Heller, 554 U.S. at 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]eference to 
legislative judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where the judgment 
has been made by a local legislature, with particular knowledge of local problems 
and insight into appropriate local solutions.”). 
1666 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1639 (2018) 
2. Circuit Court Application of Heller 
Following Heller, the circuit courts were challenged with 
determining the constitutionality of many different kinds of 
restrictions on gun possession and use.191 Because Heller and 
McDonald relied on similarities between the First and Second 
Amendment to establish the right to bear arms as an individual 
right of the people,192 the circuit courts used these connections to 
form a test analogous to the courts’ inquiry in First Amendment 
cases.193 Under a categorical approach, certain classes of speech 
have been recognized as falling outside of the protection of the 
First Amendment.194 Outside of these classes, the courts have used 
balancing in determining that restrictions on the manner in which 
the First Amendment right is exercised, or restrictions that leave 
open alternative channels to exercise the right, will be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.195 Taking from the First Amendment’s 
mixed approach, the circuits have chosen to analyze the Second 
Amendment under both in a two-step approach.196  
                                                                                                     
 191. See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 958 (analyzing a challenge to California’s 
safe storage laws); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(addressing a challenge to West Virginia’s law against possession by domestic 
violence misdemeanants); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 
2010) (reviewing Pennsylvania’s law against possession of a firearm with a 
destroyed serial number). 
 192. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (recognizing 
the similarities between the Second, First, and Fourth Amendments as 
“pre-existing right[s]”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778–79 (2010) 
(suggesting that the Second Amendment should not be singled out for separate 
treatment from the First and Fourth Amendments). 
 193. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Both 
Heller and McDonald suggest that First Amendment analogues are more 
appropriate, and on the strength of that suggestion, we and other circuits have 
already begun to adapt First Amendment doctrine to the Second Amendment 
context.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 194. See id. at 702 (recognizing certain categories of speech that are outside 
of the First Amendment’s reach, such as obscenity or defamation) (citing United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
 195. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 
2014) (discussing the parallel between the First Amendment and the current 
analysis) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 196. See id. at 960 (describing the two-step approach used by the circuits); 
Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (applying the two-step approach); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at 89 (establishing the two-step approach).  
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In the first step, the court determines whether the challenged 
regulation burdens protected conduct or if the regulation falls 
within the category of restrictions that historically are not 
protected by the Second Amendment.197 This is the categorical 
approach, which draws a line between protected conduct and those 
laws considered to be “presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures.”198 In Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco,199 
the Ninth Circuit applied this standard.200 The court asked two 
questions to determine if the restrictions fell outside of the Second 
Amendment’s protection.201 First, the court looked to the 
“presumptively lawful measures” identified in Heller.202 These are 
identified as the specific restrictions mentioned by the Heller 
majority, including restrictions on felons and the mentally ill, laws 
forbidding possession in sensitive places, restrictions on the sale of 
arms, and prohibitions on dangerous and uncommon weapons.203  
The second question attempts to determine if there are 
categories outside of those mentioned explicitly in Heller.204 For 
this analysis, the court asked “whether the record includes 
persuasive historical evidence establishing that the regulation at 
issue imposes prohibitions that fall outside the historical scope of 
the Second Amendment.”205  
When deciding the first question, the circuit courts are 
inconsistent in determining what measures related to classes of 
people are “presumptively lawful”206 outside of the examples 
                                                                                                     
 197. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960 (discussing the first step of the analysis). 
 198. Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26).  
 199. 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 200. See id. at 961 (determining if the challenged law burdens conduct within 
the Second Amendment’s protection). 
 201. See id. at 962 (asking if it is “presumptively lawful” under Heller, or if 
history suggests that it should be). 
 202. See id. at 960 (“[W]e ask whether the regulation is one of the 
‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ identified in Heller . . . .” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 203. See id. at 959 (summarizing the potential regulations that are 
constitutional). 
 204. See id. at 960 (discussing that the analysis considers those restrictions 
Heller identified or one which falls outside of the historical scope of the Second 
Amendment). 
 205. Id. at 960. 
 206. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008). 
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explicitly listed throughout Heller. This is seen in the split over the 
constitutionality of the federal law restricting domestic violence 
misdemeanants from possessing firearms.207 Despite being outside 
of Heller’s explicit mention of “law-abiding, responsible citizens,”208 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits determined that the federal law 
restricting domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing or 
receiving firearms did not clearly fall under Heller’s categorical 
exclusions from Second Amendment protection.209 The courts 
recognized the lack of historic evidence of such restrictions, with 
the Ninth Circuit specifically noting that domestic violence 
misdemeanants were not prohibited from possessing firearms 
until 1996.210 Similarly, the First and Seventh Circuits upheld the 
same statute after an application of intermediate or heightened 
scrutiny rather than outright recognizing the statute as 
presumptively lawful.211 However, the Eleventh Circuit found the 
statute to be analogous to the ban on possession by felons, and 
determined that it was presumptively lawful under Heller.212 It is 
clear that even when a restriction falls on a class outside of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens, the courts are still skeptical 
about categorically excluding full classes of people from the Second 
Amendment’s protection. 
                                                                                                     
 207. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (making it a crime for domestic violence 
misdemeanants to possess a firearm). 
 208. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 209. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th Cir. 2010) (assuming 
that the defendant’s Second Amendment rights are still intact); United States v. 
Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We must assume, therefore, that 
[Chovan]’s Second Amendment rights are intact . . . .”). 
 210. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (“Because of ‘the lack of historical evidence 
in the record before us, we are certainly not able to say that the Second 
Amendment, as historically understood, did not apply to persons convicted of 
domestic violence misdemeanors.’” (quoting Chester, 735 F.3d at 681)); Chester, 
628 F.3d at 681 (mentioning the lack of government contention and historical 
evidence that domestic violence misdemeanants were historically unprotected by 
the Second Amendment). 
 211. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (determining 
that a categorical ban requires a “substantial relationship between the restriction 
and an important governmental objective”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 
638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that § 922(g)(9) is valid only if “substantially 
related to an important governmental objective”).  
 212. See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We 
now explicitly hold that § 922(g)(9) is a presumptively lawful ‘longstanding 
prohibition[] on the possession of firearms.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)). 
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The courts are also skeptical about creating a category of 
restrictions regarding storage. The Ninth Circuit reviewed a San 
Francisco ordinance that requires handguns within a residence be 
locked in a storage container, disabled by a trigger lock, or carried 
on the person.213 Despite recognizing that a Massachusetts storage 
law existed in 1783, the court acknowledged that Heller construed 
that statute narrowly, and recognized the law to be an outlier.214 
Similarly, the Court determined storage laws regarding 
gunpowder were geared towards fire safety and were not 
dispositive of the issue.215 The safe storage law was determined not 
to be outside of Second Amendment protection based on the lack of 
historical evidence of such restrictions.216 
If the court determines that the law falls within the Second 
Amendment’s protection, then it moves on to the second step, 
where the court proceeds to apply an “appropriate level of 
scrutiny.”217 The second step follows its own two-question 
analysis.218 First, the court asks how close the law’s burden comes 
to the core of the Second Amendment.219 As discussed, Heller 
established that the core of the right is the purpose of 
self-defense.220 Second, the court analyzes how severe of a burden 
is placed on the right.221 A law that places a severe burden on the 
core of the Second Amendment right will be found unconstitutional 
under any level of scrutiny.222 However, the circuit courts have 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 
2014) (describing the restrictions set forth in San Francisco Police Code Section 
4512). 
 214. See id. at 962–63 (discerning the current regulations from those 
restricting loaded weapons from being allowed inside homes in 1783). 
 215. See id. at 963 (describing gunpowder laws from the 18th century as 
“fire-safety regulations,” and suggesting that the Second Amendment applies to 
the case). 
 216. See id. (“The other historical evidence in the record does not establish 
that prohibitions such as those in section 4512 fall outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment, as historically understood.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 217. Id. at 962. 
 218. See id. at 961 (discussing the analysis under the second prong of the test). 
 219. See id. (laying out the second step analysis). 
 220. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting Heller’s decision as to 
the core of the Second Amendment right). 
 221. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961 (setting out the second piece of the analysis 
in determining the level of scrutiny). 
 222. See id. (discussing the analysis for laws which fail both tests in the 
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determined laws that do not burden the core of the right, or that 
do not place substantial restrictions on that right, will allow the 
court to apply intermediate scrutiny.223 Such restrictions may 
simply restrict the manner in which the right may be used, or leave 
ample alternative channels for the exercise of the right.224 
The circuits have been fairly uniform when answering the first 
question. The Third,225 Fourth,226 Sixth,227 Ninth,228 Tenth,229 
Eleventh, 230 and D.C. Circuits231 have all determined that the core 
of the Second Amendment recognized in Heller is the “right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home.”232 The Ninth Circuit determined that restrictions on 
storage of firearms in the home surely burden the core of the right, 
as they directly affect the ability of an individual to use his 
                                                                                                     
second step). 
 223. See id. (addressing the analysis of laws which do not severely burden the 
right to self defense). 
 224. See id. (describing potential restrictions that may be granted 
intermediate scrutiny review). 
 225. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(discussing the Heller determination that the core purpose of the Second 
Amendment is to allow law-abiding citizens to use firearms for self-defense in the 
home). 
 226. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (defining 
the core right identified by Heller as “the right of a law-abiding, responsible 
citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense”). 
 227. See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Heller in determining the core of the Second Amendment to be self-defense in the 
home). 
 228. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 
2014) (defining the core of the Second Amendment as self-defense by law-abiding 
citizens). 
 229. See United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 
Court suggested that the core purpose of the right was to allow law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 230. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 
2012) (stating that the right to self-defense is the “central component” of the 
Second Amendment). 
 231. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (describing the burden the law in question placed on “purpose of 
self-defense in the home—the ‘core lawful purpose’ protected by the Second 
Amendment” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008))). 
 232. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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firearms to defend himself in his home.233 In another case, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the core is not burdened by 
restrictions on possession by persons who do not fit into the 
category of “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” such as domestic 
violence misdemeanants.234 This reasoning was used in the Fourth 
Circuit as well.235 For those regulations that do not burden the 
Second Amendment, the analysis of the regulation is done under 
intermediate scrutiny.236 For those that do burden the core, the 
second question must be answered before a level of scrutiny can be 
tested.237 
The second question asks whether the burden on the core of 
the Amendment is substantial.238 In Jackson, the court determined 
that the restriction did not impose a substantial burden on the core 
of the Second Amendment.239 The reasoning was that the 
regulations simply controlled the manner in which the right was 
regulated, and did not amount to a prevention of the exercise of the 
right.240 This decision has not gone unquestioned, with Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari.241 The Justices feared that any restriction found to 
burden the core of the Amendment is a threat to the right, and that 
the Supreme Court should answer the question of whether the 
                                                                                                     
 233. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (“Section 4512 therefore burdens the core 
of the Second Amendment right.”). 
 234. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“Section 922(g)(9) does not implicate this core Second Amendment right because 
it regulates firearm possession for individuals with criminal convictions.”). 
 235. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (determining that the claim is outside of the 
core of the Second Amendment due to Chester’s criminal history).  
 236. See, e.g., id. (“[W]e conclude that intermediate scrutiny is more 
appropriate than strict scrutiny for Chester and similarly situated persons.”). 
 237. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (stating that the core analysis is not the 
end of the court’s inquiry). 
 238. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (summarizing the second 
question). 
 239. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir. 
2014) (“Section 4512 does not impose the sort of severe burden that requires the 
higher level of scrutiny applied by other courts . . . .”). 
 240. See id. (stating that the restriction was only on the “manner in which 
persons may exercise their Second Amendment rights” (quoting Chovan, 735 F.3d 
at 1138)). 
 241. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco (Jackson II), 135 S. Ct. 2799, 
2802 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
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restriction is constitutional.242 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit found 
that bans on assault weapons and large capacity magazines do not 
prevent an individual from possessing a firearm in the home for 
self-defense, and, therefore, the burden was not substantial.243 
Each of these cases applied intermediate scrutiny to test the 
regulation in question.244  
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s review of a blanket ban on 
carrying an operable firearm in public and a Chicago ban on firing 
ranges determined each to be substantial burdens which amounted 
to prohibitions on exercising the Second Amendment right.245 The 
court required an analysis higher than intermediate scrutiny be 
applied to these substantial burdens.246 Finally, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that a law that imposes a burden on the core of the 
Second Amendment severe enough to essentially destroy the right 
is “unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.”247 These cases 
amount to three potential levels of scrutiny which may be applied 
to a burden on the core right of the Second Amendment. Because 
this test is able to fall within the categorical approach designed by 
Heller while also filling the holes left by the Supreme Court, it is 
the best test under which to analyze the MDHHS regulation.248 
                                                                                                     
 242. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the court of appeals 
determined that the law burdened the core of the right, and calling the court of 
appeals’ judgment “questionable”). 
 243. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e are reasonably 
certain the prohibitions do not impose a substantial burden upon [the Second 
Amendment] right.”). 
 244. See id. at 1261–62 (determining intermediate scrutiny was appropriate); 
Jackson, 746 F.3d at 965 (“[W]e apply intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 245. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012) (determining 
that a ban on carrying firearms in public was a substantial curtailment of the 
Second Amendment right); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 
2011) (describing the law as a “serious encroachment” on an “important corollary” 
to the Second Amendment’s core right). 
 246. See e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (“All this suggests that a more rigorous 
showing than [intermediate scrutiny] should be required, if not quite ‘strict 
scrutiny.’”). 
 247. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961. 
 248. See infra Part V.A (describing why this test is the best to use in this 
situation). 
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V. Applying the Test to the Michigan Regulation 
The MDHHS regulation must be subjected to a test to 
determine if it is constitutional. This Part describes why the test 
applied by the circuit courts is the best option.249 Next, it analyzes 
whether foster parents are categorically excluded from Second 
Amendment protection as a class.250 Then, should they fall under 
the Second Amendment’s protection, the two-step approach, 
discussed in Part IV.B.2, determines a proper level of scrutiny.251 
Finally, this Part draws a conclusion on the constitutionality of the 
regulation after testing it under the proper scrutiny.252 
A. The Proper Test to Analyze the Michigan Restrictions 
For the purposes of the current analysis, the review laid out 
by the circuit courts253 appears to be the best method to test the 
regulations in question. Two potential approaches exist—a 
categorical approach and an interest balancing test.254 While the 
majority in Heller was guiding the Court towards a 
categorical-only review, it left too many holes to properly apply 
that method following the decision.255 Not only does the circuit 
courts’ two-prong approach have the potential to provide better 
coverage for some of the weaknesses in each approach256 by adding 
the strengths of the other, but it also allows for both a balancing 
test and a categorical test to be done on the regulation.257 If the 
                                                                                                     
 249. Infra Part V.A. 
 250. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the first step of the circuit court test 
being used to analyze the current restriction). 
 251. See supra Part IV.B.2 (laying out the proper approach to determining the 
level of scrutiny that a regulation should be subject to when it burdens conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment). 
 252. Infra Part V.D.  
 253. See supra Part III.B.2 (describing the approach commonly used by circuit 
courts in interpreting the Second Amendment). 
 254. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing both the categorical and balancing 
approach). 
 255. See supra Part III.B.1 (laying out an analysis of the weaknesses of the 
categorical approach that Heller attempts to create). 
 256. See supra Part III.B.1 (noting shortcomings in each approach). 
 257. See supra Part III.B.2 (setting out both the categorical and balancing 
sides to the circuit court test). 
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Supreme Court determines that one of the two is the sole test to be 
used, the regulation will already be analyzed under each, allowing 
for the test to remain partially applicable. Also, Heller relied on the 
First Amendment as an analogy when supporting the refusal to 
adopt an interest balancing approach.258 The First Amendment 
has frequently been analyzed under this approach as well, 
justifying its use under Heller.259 Finally, should the Supreme 
Court decide not to take up any more Second Amendment cases, 
this test represents the likely style of appellate review to be 
applied should any regulation be challenged.  
B. Part 1: Is the Burdened Conduct Protected by the Second 
Amendment? 
The first question asks whether the conduct burdened by the 
regulations is protected by the Second Amendment.260 Initially, 
Heller specifically recognized that certain “longstanding” 
measures would be presumed lawful.261 It is clear that these 
restrictions are a new development and cannot be justified simply 
by their longstanding nature.262 However, this alone does not 
dispose of the question as to whether the prohibited conduct is 
protected by the Second Amendment.263 There still may be other 
factors that could exclude foster parents from protection, so further 
analysis is necessary. 
                                                                                                     
 258. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) 
(referencing the First Amendment multiple times in justifying the majority 
approach to the Second Amendment). 
 259. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 
2014) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (discussing 
the parallel between the First Amendment and the current analysis). 
 260. See id. at 960 (determining that the analysis should start by questioning 
if the burdened conduct is even protected by the Second Amendment). 
 261. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (noting that the opinion should not “cast 
doubt” on certain prohibitions existing before the decision). 
 262. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 10 (conceding that laws 
prohibiting irresponsible storage of firearms by foster parents are a “product of 
modern society” without a “precise historical analogue”). 
 263. See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(recognizing that the fact that a law was “not enacted until recently does not 
automatically render the [regulated conduct] within the scope of the Second 
Amendment right as historically understood”). 
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As recognized above, Heller presented five potential types of 
categories that may be excluded from protection, including 
restrictions on: (1) certain people, (2) certain places, (3) the sale of 
firearms, (4) certain types of weapons, and (5) storage to prevent 
accidents.264 Nothing in the MDHHS regulations, or any of the 
state regulations, relates to the type of firearm or the sale of 
firearms, so those will not be analyzed.265 To see if foster parents 
may be excluded from Second Amendment protection under Heller, 
three exceptions will be tested. First, foster parents may constitute 
a class of people.266 Next, Heller recognized that certain places may 
justify restrictions on their premises,267 so the foster home is 
considered under this possibility.268 Finally, the specific storage 
requirements are analyzed to see if Heller’s specific exception for 
accident prevention applies.269 These will be analyzed in light of 
the fact that courts are skeptical to extend these categories beyond 
Heller’s specific examples.270 Then, this Note explores whether the 
Second Amendment right can be relinquished through a voluntary 
contract, allowing courts to disregard Heller.271 
                                                                                                     
 264. See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text (pulling the five 
potential classes that are excluded from the Second Amendment based on Heller’s 
examples). 
 265. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (regulating the storage of 
firearms in general, making no distinction between type, and making no mention 
of the sale of firearms); infra Figure 1 (listing the restrictions in each state on 
storage alone). 
 266. See infra Part V.B.1 (determining whether foster parents as a class are 
excluded from the Second Amendment’s protection). 
 267. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken 
to cast doubt on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places . . . .”). 
 268. Infra Part V.B.2. 
 269. Infra Part V.B.3; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (“Nor, correspondingly, 
does our analysis suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms 
to prevent accidents.”). 
 270. See supra Part VI.B.2 (discussing the circuit courts’ extension of Heller’s 
categories). 
 271. Infra Part V.B.4. 
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1. Foster Parents as a Class of People 
Heller only gave two examples of classes of people who may be 
subject to presumptively lawful restrictions.272 These examples are 
felons and mentally ill persons,273 both regulated at the federal and 
state levels.274 The Heller Court did not mean for this list to 
exhaust all possible classes,275 and some other classes of people 
have been regulated by either federal or state law. These classes 
include domestic violence misdemeanants or persons under a 
domestic violence restraining order, undocumented immigrants, 
illegal drug users, former military members who were 
dishonorably discharged, and minors.276 
These groups differ from foster parents in two ways. First, the 
restrictions on these groups seems to best be justified by the 
dangers that the restricted person would pose with a firearm based 
on a tendency towards crime or lack of reason.277 Foster parents, 
on the other hand, are restricted because of the danger that a third 
party—the foster child—might pose if they gained access to the 
firearm.278 While this is a risk the state has an interest in 
                                                                                                     
 272. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (noting that 
Heller should not be read to “cast doubt” on certain restrictions, such as 
possession by the mentally ill and felons). 
 273. See id. (recognizing restrictions on felons and the mentally ill as 
prohibitions that should not be looked at with doubt following Heller). 
 274. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (g)(4) (2012) (criminalizing the possessing, 
receiving, or transporting of a firearm by any person convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment of longer than a year, and by any person adjudicated 
as “a mental defective” or who has been “committed to a mental institution”). 
 275. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26 (“[O]ur list does not purport to be 
exhaustive.”). 
 276. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (prohibiting possession, transporting, or 
receiving of a firearm by felons, unlawful drug users, mentally ill persons, 
undocumented or nonimmigrant aliens, persons who have been discharged from 
the military under “dishonorable conditions,” persons with restraining orders 
against them by an “intimate partner,” and domestic violence misdemeanants); 
id. § 922(x)(2) (making it unlawful for a juvenile to possess a handgun or 
ammunition suitable for a handgun).  
 277. See, e.g., United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(justifying restriction of habitual drug users from possessing firearms because 
“like career criminals and the mentally ill, [habitual drug users] more likely will 
have difficulty exercising self-control”). 
 278. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 3–7 (citing statistics of the 
dangers posed to children by firearms through suicide and accidents but saying 
nothing about foster parents being dangerous). 
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mitigating,279 there appear to be no examples of lawful restrictions 
that fully remove a person from Second Amendment protection to 
prevent the harm by third parties. Such potential injuries are 
normally regulated by placing restrictions on the risky individual, 
such as juveniles;280 by punishing negligent storage instead of 
strictly regulating the method of storage;281 or by restricting 
storage, but with an exception for firearms under the control of the 
owner.282 This Note does not confirm the constitutionality of those 
restrictions, but they are not as severe of a restriction on the 
Second Amendment as those placed on foster parents to prevent 
harm by third parties regardless of validity.  
Second, the Supreme Court specifically stated that the Second 
Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home.”283 Each of the groups mentioned above fall outside of 
these categories: (1) the mentally ill and juveniles would likely not 
be considered “responsible;”284 (2) undocumented immigrants are 
not “citizens;”285 and (3) the others fall outside of the 
“law-abiding”286 language. For each of these, the entire category 
falls outside of the law-abiding and responsible framework. Foster 
parents do not, as a class, fall outside of this framework. 
Individually, foster parents are held to a high standard. Federal 
law requires states to submit prospective foster parents to 
background checks.287 Certain crimes automatically disqualify an 
                                                                                                     
 279. See supra Part II.B (describing Michigan’s interest in regulating firearm 
storage in the foster home). 
 280. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (prohibiting possession of handguns by 
juveniles). 
 281. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-714.5 (2018) (criminalizing negligent 
storage of a firearm if a minor obtains access to the firearm). 
 282. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25135 (West 2018) (requiring persons who 
own or reside in a residence with a person prohibited from owning, possessing, or 
receiving a firearm to keep any firearms in the residence in locked storage or on 
their person). 
 283. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A) (2012) (requiring for states to “provide[] 
procedures for criminal records checks . . . for any prospective foster or adoptive 
parent before the foster or adoptive parent may be finally approved”). 
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applicant or require revocation of a license,288 and the states still 
have discretion to disqualify applicants convicted of other offenses 
if they are not of good character.289 For example, Michigan requires 
foster home licensees be “of such physical, mental, and emotional 
health to assure appropriate care of children,”290 and “[b]e of 
responsible character.”291 The state also requires good character 
and mental and emotional health of other members of the foster 
home.292 The agency conducts a criminal record check of all 
members of the household, including any who move in.293 MDHHS 
also requires the licensee to assist in determining whether each of 
these requirements is met.294 Finally, MDHHS requires an update 
of any changes regarding these requirements on an ongoing 
basis,295 and may revoke the license of any person who 
substantially violates these rules.296 Therefore, individual foster 
parents are required by the state to be law-abiding and 
responsible. While Heller did not present the full list of potential 
exclusions, the “law-abiding, responsible citizen” language 
explicitly pulls foster parents within the Second Amendment’s 
protection. While this is not dispositive of the issue of 
constitutionality and further analysis is necessary, foster parents, 
as a class, are not excluded from Second Amendment protection. 
                                                                                                     
 288. See id. (listing crimes for which a past conviction would be disqualifying); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.115(9)–(10) (West 2018) (mandating revocation of 
a license based on certain criminal convictions). 
 289. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9201 (2018) (specifying the qualifications 
for approval of a foster home, including requiring that a licensee be “of good moral 
character”). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id.  
 292. See id. r. 400.9202 (listing the requirements for members of the 
household). 
 293. See id. r. 400.9205 (requiring a record check of each individual in the 
household). 
 294. See id. r. 400.9206 (stating what licensees must assist the agency in 
determining). 
 295. See id. r. 400.9207 (allowing for reevaluations throughout the license 
period). 
 296. See id. § 722.121(2) (describing the power of revocation). 
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2. Foster Homes as a Sensitive Area 
Heller left open the ability to restrict possession of firearms in 
certain areas designated as “sensitive places.”297 The two examples 
given are government buildings and schools.298 The foster home is 
more sensitive than a normal home. The foster home contains 
children who are the direct responsibility of the state.299 Also, the 
state has a limited duty to protect the child from a dangerous foster 
home.300 However, there is one major difference between the foster 
home and the examples given that is likely dispositive. The 
examples given in Heller are spaces that do not seemingly fall 
within Heller’s holding, as is, because neither of the examples 
given describes a private home.301 The Supreme Court has never 
taken up the question of whether the Second Amendment protects 
the right to possess a firearm outside of the home.302 Even without 
Heller’s acknowledgment of an exception, laws prohibiting 
firearms in public places or in private schools may not be within 
the protection of the Second Amendment regardless of how 
“sensitive” they may be. The private home is specifically protected 
in Heller as the place where the need for defense is “most acute.”303 
A foster home, while subject to extra state control, remains a 
private home.304 While there is an interest of the state in protecting 
the child, that is an analysis that should be left to a scrutiny test 
                                                                                                     
 297. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 298. See id. (providing examples of “sensitive places” that may be subject to 
“presumptively lawful” restrictions).  
 299. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.10(1)(c) (2018) (defining “foster care” 
as “24-hour substitute care for children placed away from their parents or 
guardians and for whom the state agency has placement and care responsibility” 
(emphasis added)).  
 300. See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 176 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (determining that the state had a duty to refrain from placing a foster 
child in a known dangerous environment). 
 301. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (confining each of the Court’s holdings to “the 
home”). 
 302. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has not yet addressed the question whether the Second Amendment creates 
a right of self-defense outside the home.”). 
 303. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 304. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.111 (2018) (“Private home includes a 
full-time foster family home . . . .”). 
1680 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1639 (2018) 
and should not be dispositive of a restriction inside of any private 
home. 
3. Reasonable Restrictions to Prevent Accidents 
The Court did not present any examples of the final exception: 
reasonable restrictions to prevent accidents.305 The extent of the 
accident prevention exception is the statement: “Nor, 
correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the invalidity of laws 
regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”306 The 
regulations in question are specifically directed at storage,307 and 
their purpose is directly aimed at preventing accidents and 
stopping access by prohibited persons.308 Seemingly, the wording 
of Heller would apply to the regulations at hand if read with the 
little guidance given. However, Heller followed that statement by 
declaring a law requiring trigger locks on all lawfully owned 
firearms unconstitutional because of the burden it placed on the 
ability to use a firearm for self-defense.309 The regulations at hand 
require storage either with a trigger lock or in a locked cabinet or 
safe.310 The holding of Heller seems to directly exclude the ability 
to justify the MDHHS regulation under the accident prevention 
exception. A locked safe or cabinet is no less of a burden than a 
device directly locking the firearm. In addition, the requirements 
of keeping the gun unloaded and locking the ammunition 
separately increases the burden beyond what Heller found 
unconstitutionally onerous. 
                                                                                                     
 305. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (mentioning the validity of regulations aimed 
at storage to prevent accidents without describing potential methods). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (regulating the manner in 
which firearms are stored within the foster home). 
 308. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 7 (discussing the dangers of child 
access to firearms in the home and the risk of accidents that comes with it); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (2012) (criminalizing the possession of firearms by 
juveniles). 
 309. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (“[T]he 
District’s requirement . . . that firearms in the home be rendered and kept 
inoperable at all times . . . is hence unconstitutional.”). 
 310. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring that firearms are 
“[s]tored in a locked . . . gun safe” or “[t]rigger-locked and stored without 
ammunition in a locked area”). 
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Heller specifically acknowledged the lack of a self-defense 
exception in the D.C. statute.311 Also, other states and 
municipalities that have enacted similar storage requirements to 
the Michigan regulation allow an exception for direct control and 
possession of the firearm.312 Only South Carolina has such an 
exception in foster homes.313 Under Heller, it seems that there is 
no way to read in a self-defense exception to the Michigan 
regulations, and those like it.314 Also, while the Supreme Court has 
not determined the constitutionality of storage laws with an 
exception for personally carrying the firearm, the validity of such 
a statute would not be analogous to the MDHHS regulations 
because no such option exists.315 The regulations in question 
directly violate Heller, and therefore cannot be read to fall within 
the accident prevention exception. 
4. Voluntary Entry into a State Program 
The next potential avenue for excluding foster parents from 
the protection of the Second Amendment is that the foster program 
is a voluntary, contractual agreement that allows the waiver of all 
Second Amendment rights.316 There is no constitutional right to be 
a foster parent,317 and the foster parents receive funding in return 
                                                                                                     
 311. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (rejecting the argument that a self-defense 
exception can be read in to the D.C. statute). 
 312. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (“[S]uch weapon shall 
not be deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or 
other lawfully authorized user.”). 
 313. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 114-550(H)(18) (2018) (“Firearms and any 
ammunition shall be kept in a locked storage container except when being legally 
carried upon the foster parent’s person . . . .”). 
 314. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (refusing to read a self-defense exception 
where none is explicitly mentioned). 
 315. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (creating no exception for 
firearms carried by a person). 
 316. See generally MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DHS-1709, 
DEPARTMENT/FOSTER PARENT AGREEMENT (2018), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/DHS-1798_Department_Foster_Parent_ 
Agreement_320174_7.pdf (requiring foster parents to follow all agency licensing rules). 
 317. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 8, 
Shults v. Sheldon, 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2016) (“No court has found 
that there is a constitutional right to be a foster parent.”). 
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for fostering children.318 In addition, courts have determined that 
foster parents do not have the same constitutional liberty interest 
as biological families in keeping the family together once the 
relationship has been formed.319 The possibility of some liberty 
interest in foster families exists in long-term foster relationships 
or existing familial relationships.320 However, because most of the 
families burdened by these restrictions will not have such an 
interest, the restrictions must be analyzed as if the ability to be a 
foster parent is a benefit and not a right. 
The states may argue that any person may fully exercise their 
Second Amendment right by not becoming a foster parent.321 
“[F]oster parents do not enjoy the same constitutional protections 
that natural parents do,”322 and have been forced to sacrifice in 
other areas that raise questions of constitutionality, such as the 
First and Fourth Amendments.323  
Foster parents are treated as independent contractors, and on 
occasion employees, in their relationship with the state.324 “[T]he 
                                                                                                     
 318. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.2023 (2018) (setting out the rules for 
receiving state reimbursement as a foster parent). 
 319. See, e.g., Kyees v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 
1979) (“[T]he question left open by the Supreme Court in Smith should be decided 
adversely to the existence of a liberty interest in a foster care arrangement of the 
nature and duration considered here.”); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of Family 
& Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (“[W]e conclude 
that the Drummonds have no protectable liberty interest in this case.”).  
 320. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
847 (1977) (“[The foster parents’] claim to a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest raises complex and novel questions. It is unnecessary for us to resolve 
those questions definitively in this case.”); Brown v. San Joaquin Cty., 601 F. 
Supp. 653, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (“[T]he court concludes that the foster family 
relationship is sufficiently similar to other familial relationships held by the 
Supreme Court to be entitled to constitutional protection.”). 
 321. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 9, 
Shults v. Sheldon, No. 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill., Nov. 16, 2016) (“If [the Shultses] 
choose to no longer be foster parents, they will not be subject to any of the 
restrictions that they complain of.”). 
 322. Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 323. See infra notes 344–362 and accompanying text (discussing the potential 
conflicts between foster home regulation and the First and Fourth Amendments). 
 324. See, e.g., Mitzner ex rel. Bishop v. State, 891 P.2d 435, 439 (Kan. 1995) 
(“Limiting our choice of status to employee or independent contractor, the latter 
is the appropriate categorization of a foster parent.”); Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 
582, 587 (Ill. 2000) (“[W]e must conclude that the [foster parents] were 
independent contractors rather than employees or agents of the state.”); see also 
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government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does 
the government as sovereign.”325 The Supreme Court has limited 
this by establishing that employment’s voluntary nature does not 
allow the government to unreasonably infringe on the 
constitutional rights of employees.326 However, the courts have 
never discussed the topic of unconstitutional conditions in the 
context of foster care or the Second Amendment. This Note will 
next look at the application of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in the First Amendment to see how it might apply to the 
Second Amendment question presented. Next, this section will 
look at other potential conflicts that arise between restrictions on 
foster parents and constitutional rights to see if they can guide the 
question in the foster care context. 
The Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that the 
voluntary nature of employment is not alone sufficient to justify 
the waiver of constitutional rights.327 The Court has applied this in 
the employment context for hiring,328 firing,329 and nonrenewal of 
a contract.330 The same standard has been extended to protect 
independent contractors with pre-existing relationships with the 
government from having their contract terminated for exercising 
their First Amendment rights.331 The Court has not had the 
opportunity to answer this question as it pertains to independent 
                                                                                                     
Hunte v. Blumenthal, 680 A.2d 1231, 1235 (Conn. 1996) (“[T]he [foster parents] 
qualify as employees of the state and are not independent contractors.”). 
 325. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994). 
 326. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (recognizing that the 
court has held on multiple occasions that unconstitutional conditions may not be 
placed on the receipt of government benefits). 
 327. See, e.g., id. (“For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear 
that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental 
benefit . . . [the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
infringes his constitutionally protected interests . . . .”). 
 328. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (extending 
First Amendment protections to employees in hiring decisions). 
 329. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (applying First Amendment 
protections to employees dismissed for their political beliefs). 
 330. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 598 (stating that the Court has held on multiple 
occasions that nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher’s contract may not be based 
on the exercise of First or Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
 331. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 685 (1996) (applying 
the same test to the termination of an independent contract as would be applied 
in an employment case that involves an unconstitutional condition). 
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contractors who do not have existing relationships with the 
government, such as those bidding for a contract, and the circuit 
courts are split on the issue.332 However, in the context of the 
current regulations on foster homes, the test should be applied 
equally to new foster parents as well as those with longstanding 
relationships, similar to the extension to employees in the hiring 
context.333 First, the main concern of the Court in extending 
employee protection to independent contractors is the reduced 
control.334 Through its regulations and routine checks of the foster 
home, the state still maintains a significant amount of control over 
foster parents.335 Also, the danger the state is trying to mitigate 
arrives once the foster child is in the home,336 so it makes no sense 
to differentiate between people applying and those who have an 
existing relationship with the state. If the state is able to place a 
restriction on firearms storage when approving a foster license, to 
have the existence of the relationship allow the foster parent to 
disregard the restrictions once the child is in the home would 
defeat the purpose of the regulations. Therefore, the test below for 
unconstitutional conditions should be applied equally to 
prospective and existing foster parents, whether considered 
employees or independent contractors. Because the Second 
Amendment right has been analogized to the First Amendment,337 
the same test should be applied to burdens placed on each right. 
In analyzing conflicts that arise when employees and 
independent contractors face conditions that restrict First 
                                                                                                     
 332. See Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 463 F.3d 378, 386 
(5th Cir. 2006) (extending Umbehr to government contractors without an existing 
relationship with the government). But see McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 
812, 817 (3rd Cir. 1999) (limiting Umbehr to existing relationships). 
 333. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 79 (applying First Amendment protection in the 
context of employee hiring). 
 334. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676–77 (discussing how independent 
contractors are greater removed from government control than employees). 
 335. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LICENSING RULES FOR 
FOSTER FAMILY HOMES AND FOSTER FAMILY GROUP HOMES FOR CHILDREN (2015), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/CWL-PUB-10_502652_7.pdf 
(setting out the requirements for the licensing of foster homes in Michigan). 
 336. See supra Part II.B (setting out the justification for regulating firearm 
storage in foster homes). 
 337. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (comparing 
the Second Amendment right to the individual rights protected by the First 
Amendment). 
IN DEFENSE OF HEARTH AND [FOSTER] HOME 1685 
Amendment rights, the Court applies the test developed in 
Pickering v. Board of Education.338 This test requires balancing the 
“interests of the [employee], as a citizen . . . and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”339 The interest in 
Pickering of commenting on matters of public concern was 
recognized as a core value of the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause.340 Similarly, the interest in keeping an operational firearm 
in the home for the purpose of self-defense is a core value of the 
Second Amendment.341 As for the state’s interest in promoting the 
efficiency of the foster system, while they must regulate the foster 
parents due to a lack of direct control over day to day operations, 
there is no evidence to suggest that foster homes would not be 
equally as efficient under less restrictive firearm requirements. 
Some states use less restrictive alternatives,342 and nothing 
suggests that their systems are unable to achieve the state’s 
goals.343 To require measures as restrictive as Michigan’s is 
impermissible based on this analysis, as it restricts the interest of 
the foster parent beyond what is necessary. Because this test has 
not been applied directly to foster care regulations, some of the 
other restrictions that raise constitutional questions are reviewed 
to see if an analogy suggests that the Second Amendment may be 
restricted outside of the Pickering analysis. 
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that foster parents did not 
have a constitutionally protected free exercise right to use corporal 
punishment on their foster child.344 In response to the religious 
                                                                                                     
 338. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676–79 (discussing the 
application of the Pickering test to employees and independent contractors). 
 339. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 340. See id. at 573 (recognizing debate on matters of public concern as the 
“core value” of free speech). 
 341. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (describing the “core lawful purpose of 
self-defense” under the Second Amendment). 
 342. See, e.g., HAW. CODE R. § 17-1625-22 (LexisNexis 2018) (requiring that 
the foster home be generally equipped with protection from firearms). 
 343. See infra notes 425–426 and accompanying text (discussing the very 
limited research on the dangers posed to foster children). 
 344. See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he 
Backlunds must show that they, as foster parents, had a clearly established right 
to exercise their religious beliefs about punishment on a foster care child. They 
fail to cite any pertinent authority . . . . Nor can they . . . .”). 
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defense of corporal punishment, the court noted that “even natural 
parents have no clearly established right to unlimited exercise of 
religious beliefs on their children.”345 There was no authority to 
show that foster parents were singled out from the general 
population.346  
In contrast, the Second Amendment protects the general 
population from interference with the right of responsible and 
law-abiding citizens to protect themselves in the home.347 Foster 
parents fit within this definition, and the regulations single them 
out for exclusion from Second Amendment protection. The Ninth 
Circuit simply determined that the relationship between the foster 
parent and foster child “confer[red] no new constitutional 
rights.”348 The constitutional right to keep arms already exists.349 
Additionally, other courts have recognized that the foster children 
and their biological parents have a free exercise interest that must 
be reasonably accommodated in the foster home.350 This means 
that the foster parent’s extension of religious beliefs onto their 
foster child could potentially conflict with the constitutional rights 
of others. In contrast, the exercise of Second Amendment rights in 
the foster home does not conflict with the rights of parents or the 
child. These situations are not analogous. 
Additionally, foster parents often lose their ability to protect 
themselves from searches of their home by the department 
responsible for the child.351 However, the Fourth Amendment 
comparison also fails to justify the restrictions on firearms. The 
Fourth Amendment does not protect from searches in general. It 
                                                                                                     
 345. Id. 
 346. See id. (determining that the Backlunds failed to cite any pertinent 
authority showing that a cognizable right had been infringed because that right 
is not even established for natural parents). 
 347. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (concluding that the Second Amendment 
protects the right for responsible citizens to possess firearms for the purpose of 
self-defense in the home). 
 348. Backlund, 778 F.2d at 1390. 
 349. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (preserving the right to “keep and bear arms”). 
 350. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1347 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding 
that the state must make reasonable efforts to assure the foster child’s religious 
needs are met while the state is responsible). 
 351. See Wildauer v. Frederick Cty., 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(determining that the state’s interest in examining a foster child who may have 
been neglected outweighs Wildauer’s privacy interest). 
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protects the people from searches deemed “unreasonable.”352 In 
cases involving foster parents, courts have either applied the 
“special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment,353 or have 
decided the matter on general principles of qualified immunity.354 
Instead, administrative searches of homes in which foster children 
reside may simply be deemed reasonable based on the 
circumstances.355 This is a fact specific inquiry that the language 
of the Amendment explicitly calls for with the word 
“unreasonable.”356 Similar laws have been upheld in other 
situations, such as periodic home visits to ensure eligibility as a 
condition on the receipt of welfare benefits.357 The Supreme Court 
determined that such searches by caseworkers were reasonable 
based on the public interest and the difference between these 
searches and traditional searches.358 Also, the home is only opened 
up to a limited number of officials for specific administrative 
checks359 or for investigative home visits that apply in contexts 
outside of foster homes.360  
                                                                                                     
 352. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 353. See Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 372 (“In determining whether a search and 
seizure is reasonable, we must balance the government’s need to search with the 
invasion endured by the plaintiff.”); see also Doriane L. Coleman, Storming the 
Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the 
Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 417 n.6 (2005) (stating that the 
“special needs doctrine” applies in civil cases, and the constitutionality of searches 
and seizures is determined by “reasonableness balancing analysis”). 
 354. See Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 372 (granting the defendants qualified 
immunity because “they did ‘not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’” (quoting 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). 
 355. See id. at 372–73 (determining that multiple searches of the plaintiff’s 
home by a social worker accompanied by police officers and nurses were 
“reasonable” based on the circumstances of each). 
 356. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 357. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (determining the searches 
were a “reasonable administrative tool”). 
 358. See id. at 318–24 (determining that if the searches were those considered 
by the Fourth Amendment they would not be unreasonable). 
 359. See, e.g., ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 89 § 402.27 (2018) (requiring at least 
semiannual visits to licensed facilities to ensure continued compliance). 
 360. See Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 372 (“[I]nvestigative home visits by social 
workers are not subject to the same scrutiny as searches in the criminal context.”); 
see also Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318 (determining that a New York law conditioning 
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The Second Amendment, on the other hand, does not qualify 
the restriction it places on the government. It simply states that 
the people’s right “shall not be infringed.”361 This is bolstered by 
Heller rejecting a fact specific inquiry,362 meaning that the storage 
restrictions cannot be justified without a waiver of the Second 
Amendment. Because the restrictions on firearms apply in the 
foster home at all times, they are a full denial of the right, not just 
a partial burden, which goes well beyond the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment issue that arises from occasional home inspections by 
agency officials. These Fourth Amendment issues are not 
analogous and cannot justify the regulations in question.  
Because foster parents cannot be removed from the protection 
of the Second Amendment for any of the above reasons, the 
regulations in question fall within the scope of the right.363 
Therefore, part two of the test must be conducted to determine if 
the regulations pass constitutional muster.364 
C. Part 2: Determining the Proper Level of Scrutiny 
As stated above, the circuit courts have employed a two-step 
inquiry based on the Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis 
used to determine the constitutionality of restrictions burdening 
Second Amendment rights.365 The second step in the test involves 
its own set of two questions.366 First, it must be determined how 
close the burden comes to the core of the Second Amendment 
                                                                                                     
the receipt of welfare benefits on a social worker’s home visit was not 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
 361. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 362. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) (rejecting 
the notion that future courts should weigh the interests in each case involving the 
Second Amendment). 
 363. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 
2014) (stating that regulations either fall within the scope of the right or within 
categories that are unprotected). 
 364. See id. (“If a prohibition falls within the historical scope of the Second 
Amendment, we must then proceed to the second step of the Second Amendment 
inquiry . . . .”). 
 365.  See id. (describing the two-step inquiry used by the majority of circuits, 
which “bears strong analogies to the Supreme Court’s free-speech caselaw”). 
 366. See id. at 960–61 (setting out the two-step process for “ascertaining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny”).  
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right.367 The majority of circuits have recognized the core purpose 
of the right as self-defense within the home.368 Second, the severity 
of the burden placed on that right by the regulation is analyzed.369 
A law that imposes a severe restriction on the core of the Second 
Amendment right will be “unconstitutional under any level of 
scrutiny.”370 If the core of the right is not burdened, or that burden 
is not severe, then intermediate scrutiny is the proper test.371 
1. Does the Regulation Burden the Core of the Second 
Amendment Right? 
There are two restrictions similar to the ones analyzed in this 
Note that have been tested against the core of the Second 
Amendment—the right to possess a firearm for self-defense in the 
home.372 The most analogous is the D.C. restriction struck down in 
Heller, which required all lawfully owned firearms to be equipped 
with a trigger lock or rendered inoperable.373 The other is the San 
Francisco ordinance in question in Jackson, which requires all 
handguns to be stored in a locked container or with a trigger lock 
unless carried by a person.374 While each of these is less restrictive 
                                                                                                     
 367. See id. (describing the first step as an analysis of “the extent to which 
the law burdens the core of the Second Amendment right”). 
 368. See supra notes 225–231 and accompanying text (recognizing multiple 
circuits that have recognized the core of the Second Amendment right to be 
self-defense in the home). 
 369. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961–62 (noting that the second question is the 
severity of the burden placed on the right). 
 370. Id. at 961. 
 371. See id. (“[I]f a challenged law does not implicate a core Second 
Amendment right, or does not place a substantial burden on the Second 
Amendment right, [the court] may apply intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 372. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (referring to the “core lawful purpose of 
self-defense”); see also supra notes 225–231 and accompanying text (recognizing 
multiple circuits that have determined the core of the Second Amendment right 
to be self-defense in the home). 
 373. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008) 
(“District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned 
firearms, such as registered long guns, unloaded and dissembled or bound by a 
trigger lock or similar device . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)), with MICH. 
ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be kept in locked storage 
or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate storage). 
 374. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 
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than the foster care restrictions, each was still determined to 
burden the core of the Second Amendment by rendering firearms 
inoperable for the purpose of self-defense.375 Following these cases, 
there is no doubt that requiring foster parents to keep all firearms 
in the home locked in a container places a burden on the core of the 
Second Amendment. Because of this, the second prong must be 
analyzed. However, the answer to the second prong is not so easily 
determined based on these cases.  
2. How Severe is the Law’s Burden on the Right? 
Heller and Jackson remain the best analogies to the 
regulations on foster parents when determining the proper level of 
scrutiny to apply.376 While Heller did not apply this exact test, the 
Court determined that the D.C. requirement was unconstitutional 
because it made it “impossible for citizens to use them for the core 
lawful purpose of self-defense.”377 Impossibility is a severe burden 
on the right. On the other hand, Jackson determined that the San 
Francisco ordinance was not a severe burden, and applied 
intermediate scrutiny.378 Each of these restrictions will be 
analyzed to determine which is a better comparison to the one in 
question here. 
The D.C. statute analyzed in Heller has a couple of important 
characteristics related to the current analysis. First, the 
requirement that firearms be bound by a trigger lock or be kept 
unloaded or disassembled applied to all lawfully owned 
firearms.379 Second, the restriction contained no exception for a 
                                                                                                     
2014) (stating the requirements of San Francisco Police Code Section 4512). 
 375. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (concluding that a requirement that lawfully 
owned firearms in the home be rendered inoperable “makes it impossible for 
citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence 
unconstitutional”); Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (“Section 4512 therefore burdens the 
core of the Second Amendment right.”). 
 376. See supra notes 373–374 and accompanying text (comparing the 
Michigan regulation regarding foster parents to the restrictions analyzed in 
Heller and Jackson). 
 377. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 378. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 965 (“[B]ecause [the ordinance] does not impose 
a substantial burden on conduct protected by the Second Amendment, we apply 
intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 379. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575 (discussing the requirement that District of 
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weapon that was carried on the person.380 Finally, while the 
statute contained exceptions for firearms “located in a place of 
business” and firearms “being used for lawful recreational 
activities,”381 the Court determined that the statute could not be 
read to contain an exception for self-defense.382 
The San Francisco ordinance analyzed in Jackson differed 
significantly on these points. First, the ordinance applied only to 
handguns and not all lawfully owned firearms.383 Second, the law 
contained an explicit exception for firearms “carried on the person 
of an individual over the age of 18.”384  
With the exception of South Carolina385 and the states without 
explicit requirements for firearm storage in foster homes, the 
regulations in question are significantly more analogous to the 
D.C. law. First, the regulations each apply to all firearms, and not 
just a specific subset.386 Second, the least restrictive regulations, 
which just require the firearms to be locked, contain no exception 
for recreational purposes or self-defense.387 This makes the 
requirements at least as restrictive as those in Heller, if not more 
so. As each additional requirement is added on in the different 
                                                                                                     
Columbia residents “keep their lawfully owned firearms” bound by a trigger lock 
or rendered inoperable). 
 380. See id. (describing the statute and mentioning no exception related to 
firearms carried on the owner). 
 381. Id. 
 382. See id. at 630 (concluding that a self-defense exception is “precluded by 
the unequivocal text, and by the presence of certain other enumerated 
exceptions”). 
 383. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 958 (stating that San Francisco Police Code 
Section 4512 provided that “handguns” in a residence must be bound by a trigger 
lock or kept in a locked container). 
 384. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 385. South Carolina’s regulation contains an explicit exception for firearms 
carried by the foster parent. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 114-550(H)(18) (2018). This 
Note does not draw any conclusions on the constitutionality of storage 
requirements with this additional exception. 
 386. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 10.1080(b) (2018) (requiring foster 
parents “ensure that any firearms are unloaded and stored in a locked gun safe 
or other locked place” (emphasis added)); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 70E.1110(g) 
(2018) (“Explosive materials, ammunition, and firearms shall each be stored 
separately, in locked places.” (emphasis added)). 
 387. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 78-2-15.6 (2018) (“An agency shall ensure that 
weapons, related attachments and ammunition are stored in a locked container 
inaccessible to children.”). 
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states, the burden becomes significantly more severe than in 
Heller. Jackson presents one argument relevant to the restrictions 
at hand, claiming that a modern gun safe can be opened quickly.388 
However, Heller makes no mention of the speed at which trigger 
locks could be removed in its consideration of the restriction just 
ten years ago.389 Additionally, Jackson relies on the ability of San 
Francisco’s citizens to use alternative channels by carrying the 
handgun on their person.390 San Francisco would also allow for the 
use of lawfully owned firearms other than handguns to be used.391 
No such alternative channels exist in the regulations in question. 
There is no doubt that the regulations on foster parents 
analyzed here place a severe burden on the core of the Second 
Amendment. 
3. Rejecting the Case for Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Western District of Michigan determined that 
intermediate scrutiny is the proper measure to apply to 
regulations like the Michigan safe-storage measure.392 However, 
the court’s reasoning is flawed for four reasons. First, it relies 
heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion in Tyler v. Hillsdale 
County Sheriff’s Department393 that firearm bans concerning the 
mentally ill are subject to intermediate scrutiny.394 The Western 
District of Michigan relied on this case because the “Sixth Circuit 
has never applied strict scrutiny to a Second Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 388. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir. 
2014) (“The record indicates that a modern gun safe may be opened quickly.”). 
 389. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (addressing 
the trigger lock requirement but making no mention of the ease or hardship of 
removing the lock). 
 390. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (discussing the alternative channels 
allowing for self-defense in the home). 
 391. See id. at 958 (noting that the restriction only applies to handguns). 
 392. See opinion at 23, Johnson v. Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 
14, 2018) [hereinafter Opinion] (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard despite the Plaintiffs’ strong argument for the application of strict 
scrutiny.”). 
 393. 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 394. See id. at 21-22 (citing Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 
678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc)) (“The most relevant discussion of the choice of 
scrutiny from the Sixth Circuit comes from the court’s en banc opinion in Tyler.”). 
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challenge” under the two-step framework.395 However, Firearm 
regulations pertaining to the mentally ill are specifically noted in 
Heller as potential exclusions under the Second Amendment.396 In 
the end, the Sixth Circuit did not exclude the mentally ill from the 
Second Amendment. Instead, it reasoned, based on Heller, that the 
mentally ill are not at the core of the Second Amendment in the 
second step of the two-step framework.397 The court’s reasoning 
also focused on the mentally ill as being “presumptively 
dangerous.”398 Nothing suggests that foster parents would be 
treated similarly. The Western District of Michigan relies on a 
dangerous false equivalency by adopting the Tyler rationale to 
analyze the Michigan regulation. 
Second, in deciding that intermediate scrutiny should apply, 
the district court focuses on foster parents as “a narrow class of 
citizens who volunteer to assume the burdens and benefits of 
serving as foster parents.”399 The voluntary aspect of this 
reasoning has already been analyzed.400 As for the narrow class, 
the Second Amendment is an individual right of each person.401 
Never has a court suggested, in deciding the appropriate standard 
to apply to a regulation affecting an individual right, that lower 
levels of scrutiny apply when the affected group is smaller. 
Consequently, a burden on a single individual is still an absolute 
burden on the Second Amendment because what is at issue is an 
individual right. Tyler makes reference to a “narrow class of 
individuals.”402 However, the reference does not focus solely on the 
size, but rather returns to the court’s reasoning that the class at 
issue—the mentally ill—is “not at the core of the Second 
                                                                                                     
 395. Id. at 22. 
 396. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (suggesting certain “longstanding 
prohibitions” may still be appropriate following the opinion).  
 397. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 691 (6th Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (“Reviewing § 922(g)(4) under strict scrutiny would invert Heller’s 
presumption that prohibitions on the mentally ill are lawful.”). 
 398. Id. at 691. 
 399. Opinion, supra note 392, at 23. 
 400. Supra Part V.A.4. 
 401. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (concluding 
that the Second Amendment confers an individual right based on “both text and 
history”). 
 402. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 691. 
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Amendment.”403 The district court is wrong in relying on the size 
and voluntary nature of the class. 
Third, the district court relies on Tyler to suggest that 
intermediate scrutiny should apply to afford state agencies 
“‘considerable flexibility’ in regulating health and safety 
concerns.”404 Yet, Tyler does not support this proposition. Tyler 
mentions “[Congress’] considerable flexibility to regulate gun 
safety.”405 But, Tyler does not make mention of health and safety, 
nor does it reference the benefit of flexibility as a reason to choose 
intermediate scrutiny.406 The court simply notes that intermediate 
scrutiny is beneficial because it allows flexibility while still 
requiring the government to justify its regulations.407 The court 
concluded that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate because the 
restriction “does not burden the core of the Second Amendment” 
but does “place a substantial burden on conduct and persons 
protected by the Second Amendment.”408 
The district court cannot rely solely on this analysis because 
the Michigan regulation burdens the core of the Second 
Amendment and places a substantial burden on protected 
conduct409—the only two questions in the second step of the test 
applied under the two-step test.410 Additionally, the government’s 
interest in protecting health and safety is already analyzed under 
the test set out by each level of scrutiny.411 If the interest in 
                                                                                                     
 403. Id. It would be absurd to allow regulations that burden individual rights 
to garner a lower level of scrutiny simply because the burden is placed on one 
individual at a time rather than the entire population. 
 404. Opinion, supra note 392, at 23 (quoting Tyler, 837 F.3d at 692). 
 405. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 692 (alteration in original) (quoting Bonidy v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
 406. See id. (noting the benefits of the intermediate scrutiny approach the 
court had already chosen). 
 407. See id. (noting why intermediate scrutiny is “preferable in evaluating 
challenges to § 922(g)(4)”). 
 408. Id. 
 409. See supra Parts V.C.1; V.C.2 (concluding that the Michigan regulation 
meets both requirements for strict scrutiny). 
 410. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 690 (6th Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (setting out the proper test to determine the appropriate level of 
scrutiny). 
 411. See id. at 693 (stating that intermediate scrutiny requires the government 
to state an objective that is “significant, substantial, or important”); United States 
v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (stating that strict scrutiny 
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regulating safety and health is compelling, it will be considered 
during the scrutiny analysis. Suggesting that the government’s 
interest in regulating health and safety and its “need” for 
flexibility should help determine the level of scrutiny would 
essentially allow any compelling interest to be afforded 
intermediate scrutiny. This would render strict scrutiny pointless. 
Therefore, the Western District of Michigan was wrong to consider 
factors other than the core of the Second Amendment and the 
severity of the burden in determining the level of scrutiny. 
Finally, the district court made reference to Jackson as the 
“most factually-analogous ‘safe storage’ ordinance” and noted that 
“the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny.”412 However, the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning failed to show how Jackson is factually 
analogous. The Ninth Circuit determined that the San Francisco 
ordinances did not “impose the sort of severe burden that requires 
the higher level of scrutiny.”413 That was because the San 
Francisco safe storage ordinance was only applicable to 
handguns.414 Also, “section 4512 le[ft] open alternative channels 
for self-defense in the home, because San Franciscans [we]re not 
required to secure their handguns while carrying them on their 
person.”415 In contrast, the Michigan regulation does not provide 
either of these exceptions.416 Therefore, the district court was 
wrong to suggest that Jackson was sufficiently analogous to guide 
its reasoning. 
Based on these issues with the district court’s analysis, it is 
still appropriate to reject intermediate scrutiny and suggest that 
the regulation meets the requirements of the test’s second prong.417 
This should end the issue here because such restrictions are 
                                                                                                     
requires a “compelling Government interest”). 
 412. Opinion, supra note 392, at 23 (citing Jackson v. City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 413. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 414. See id. at 958 (discussing the relevant code section restricting handgun 
storage in homes). 
 415. Id. at 964. 
 416. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring locked storage of 
all firearms in a foster home). 
 417. See supra Parts V.C.1; V.C.2 (concluding that the Michigan regulation 
places a severe burden on the core of the Second Amendment). 
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“unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.”418 However, rather 
than automatically declaring them invalid, some circuits have 
decided to apply strict scrutiny to regulations that severely burden 
the core of the Second Amendment.419 Also, the courts apply strict 
scrutiny to regulations that severely restrict speech and due 
process rights.420 Therefore, the following subpart applies strict 
scrutiny to the regulation to account for the possibility that a court 
will do so when analyzing the foster home regulations. 
D. Applying Strict Scrutiny 
Strict scrutiny requires that a law be “narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest.”421 Also, “[i]f a less 
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the 
legislature must use that alternative.”422 There seems to be a 
compelling interest of the state to protect the children for whom it 
is responsible from the dangers of firearms in the home.423 Also, 
the state has at least some duty to protect the child from a 
dangerous foster home.424 Some sources suggest that suicide rates 
are higher among foster children than the normal population.425 
                                                                                                     
 418. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961. 
 419. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Our 
task, therefore, is to select between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 420. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 
1267, 1269 (2007) (stating that strict scrutiny is “the baseline rule” for analyzing 
content based restrictions on speech, as well as being applied in due process cases 
restricting fundamental rights (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 421. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. 
 422. Id. 
 423. See supra Part II.B (describing the dangers firearms pose to children in 
the United States). 
 424. See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 176 (4th 
Cir. 2010) (determining that the state had a duty to refrain from placing a foster 
child in a known dangerous environment). 
 425. See NAT’L CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH SUICIDE, PREVENTING 
SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR AMONG YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE 1 (2016), 
http://www.mhawisconsin.org/Data/Sites/1/media/impact-of-suicide-2016/out-of-
folder-4—preventing-suicidal-behavior-among-youth-in-foster-care-(foster-parent).pdf 
(“Studies have found that youth involved in child welfare or juvenile justice were 
3 to 5 times more likely to die by suicide than youth in the general population.”); 
Daniel J. Pilowsky & Li-Tzy Wu, Psychiatric Symptoms and Substance Use 
Disorders in a Nationally Representative Sample of American Adolescents 
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However, this evidence does not clearly establish that risk of 
suicide and unintentional firearm injuries are higher in foster 
homes.426 Also, Heller specifically notes that while handgun 
violence is an issue, “the enshrinement of constitutional rights 
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”427 Whether 
the interest is compelling may be a fact-specific determination 
made in each case. Assuming the state’s interest is compelling, the 
restriction must be narrowly tailored as well.428 
The restrictions in question are not narrowly tailored. As 
discussed above, the interest Michigan claims in regulating 
storage in the foster home is to protect foster children from 
accidents and suicides.429 The law is overly restrictive in that it 
attempts to achieve the goal of protecting children by also 
restricting everyone else in the foster home from accessing 
firearms. There is no interest cited to suggest that foster parents 
pose a specific danger to the foster child when they can access 
firearms for self-defense, so restricting them as well goes beyond 
the scope of the compelling interest of the state. Also, the 
government must choose any less restrictive means of achieving 
the same goal.430 An exhaustive search has uncovered no evidence 
that restrictions allowing for foster parents to carry firearms on 
their person are any less successful than the restrictions in 
question. Similarly, regulations that punish foster parents who 
store firearms in a location accessible to the foster children may be 
similarly as successful without specifically dictating where storage 
                                                                                                     
Involved with Foster Care, 38 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 351, 356 (2006) (determining 
that children living away from both parents are at an increased risk of suicide 
attempts, whether caused by the separation or some other factor in the 
relationship prior to separation). 
 426. The National Center for the Prevention of Youth Suicide relies on a study 
from Quebec. See NAT’L CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH SUICIDE, supra note 
425, at 5. Also, the study cited says there may be a correlation between foster 
children and higher suicide risk, but does not claim any determinative findings. 
See Daniel J. Pilowsky & Li-Tzy Wu, supra note 425, at 351. 
 427. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). 
 428. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) 
(setting out the proper test for a strict scrutiny analysis). 
 429. See supra Part II.B (setting out the interests posed in support of the 
Michigan regulations). 
 430. See Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 813 (“If a less restrictive 
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative.”). 
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must occur. This would be easier to monitor than in a normal home 
due to the increased access of the state into foster homes to ensure 
compliance with regulations.431 While this Note draws no 
conclusions on the constitutionality of these restrictions, it also 
finds no evidence that states without the severe requirements on 
storage are any less successful in preventing harm to foster 
children than those with the increased burden. Therefore, the 
states that require locked storage of all firearms in foster homes, 
regardless of additional restrictions on ammunition, fail to 
overcome the heavy burden of strict scrutiny. 
VI. Conclusion 
Regulations on firearms in foster homes are commonplace in 
the United States. Forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
require foster parents to store firearms in the home in locked 
cabinets or disable firearms with a trigger lock.432 Thirty-eight of 
those states and the District of Columbia add additional 
requirements on top of those restrictions.433 This Note does not 
comment on whether these are common sense regulations from a 
policy standpoint. When a right is enumerated in the Constitution, 
common sense is no longer the threshold for achieving state goals. 
State regulation of firearm storage in foster homes places a burden 
on an enumerated right and, therefore, must comply with the 
Second Amendment and District of Columbia v. Heller. Heller 
made clear that the Second Amendment protects the right of 
law-abiding individuals to possess operable, legally owned 
firearms in the home for use in self-defense.434 In analyzing the 
state regulations against this right, foster parents as a class may 
not be excluded from Second Amendment protection. Additionally, 
the regulations in question are either unconstitutional under any 
                                                                                                     
 431. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring foster 
parents to allow MDHHS access to the home for licensing and foster care 
purposes). 
 432. Infra Figure 1. 
 433. See infra Figure 1 (recognizing other restrictions states place on foster 
parents). 
 434. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that bans on handgun possession 
and rendering lawful firearms operable for self-defense in the home are 
unconstitutional). 
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level of scrutiny, or must be subject to strict scrutiny. Under either 
test, regulations that require all firearms in the foster home to be 
stored in a locked safe or disabled by a trigger lock, as well as those 
which place additional restrictions on the storage of ammunition, 
are unconstitutional.  
The forty-four states that regulate in this fashion have a 
strong interest in protecting foster children, but they must find an 
alternative way to achieve their goal. The Author does not 
recommend the best method to do so without overstepping the 
limits of the Second Amendment. However, the states have chosen 
the most restrictive way possible up to this point, and they surely 
can find less restrictive alternatives for the future. The Attorney 
General of Michigan put it best: “Given that we trust [certain] 
individuals with the great responsibility of caring for [the state’s 
most vulnerable] children, it makes sense that we would also trust 
them to do what we trust every other law-abiding citizen to do: 
exercise responsible gun ownership.”435 
  
                                                                                                     
 435. Amicus Curiae Brief of Attorney General Bill Schuette in Support of 
Plaintiffs at 1, Johnson v. Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2017). 

































Citation to State Regulation 
specifically addressing storage 
or handling of firearms in 
foster homes  
Alabama Yes Yes (Locked) No ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-29-
.03(3)(g–h) (2018). 
Alaska Yes Yes No ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 
§ 10.1080(b) (2018). 
Arizona Yes Yes (Locked) Yes ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE 
§ R21-8-106 (2018). 
Arkansas Yes Yes (Locked) No 016.15.2 ARK. CODE R. § 208 
(LexisNexis 2018). 
California Yes Yes (Locked) No CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, 
§ 89387.2 (2018). 
Colorado Yes Yes (Locked) No 12 COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-
8:7.708.22(B)(2) (2018). 
Connecticut Yes Yes (Locked) Yes (when 
possible) 
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-
145-141 (2018). 




Yes Yes (Locked) Yes D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, 
§ 6007.9 (2018). 
Florida Yes Yes (Locked) No FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 
65G-2.007(12)(c) (2018). 
Georgia Yes No No GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 
290-9-2-.07(5)(a)(9)(ii)(IX) 
(2018). 
Hawaii No No No HAW. CODE R. § 17-1625-22 
(LexisNexis 2018). 
Idaho Yes No No IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 
16.06.02.435 (2018) 
Illinois Yes Yes Yes ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 89 § 402.8 
(2018); ILL. DEP’T CHILDREN & 
FAMILY SERVS., POL’Y GUIDE 
2015.08, ENHANCED FIREARM  
SAFETY IN FOSTER FAMILY 
HOMES (2015). 
 
Indiana Yes Yes (Locked) No 465 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1.5-
10(c) (West 2018). 
IN DEFENSE OF HEARTH AND [FOSTER] HOME 1701 
Iowa Yes Yes (Locked) No IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 
441-113.7(237) (2018). 
Kansas Yes Yes (Locked) No KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-4-820 
(2018). 
Kentucky No No No 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:350 
(2018). 
Louisiana Yes Yes (Locked) No LA. ADMIN CODE. tit. 67, 
§ 7313 (2018). 
Maine Yes Yes (Locked) No 10-148-016 ME. CODE R. 
§ 9(E)(7) (LexisNexis 2018). 
Maryland Yes No No MD. CODE REGS. 
07.05.02.10(G)(1) (2018). 
Massachusetts Yes Yes (Locked) Yes 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 
7.105(16) (2018). 
Michigan Yes Yes (Locked) No MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 
400.9415(3) (2018) 
Minnesota Yes Yes No MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., 
DHS 0644, CHILD FOSTER 
CARE HOME SAFETY 
CHECKLIST (2017). 
Mississippi No No No 18-6:1 MISS. ADMIN. CODE. 
§ F-II (2018). 
Missouri Yes Yes (Locked) No MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 35-60.040 (2018). 
Montana Yes Yes (Locked) No MONT. ADMIN. R. 
37.51.901(13) (2018). 
Nebraska Yes Yes (Locked) No 395 NEB. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 3-001.17D (2018). 




Yes Yes (Locked) No N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. He-C 
6446.10 (2018). 
New Jersey Yes Yes (Locked) No N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 3A:51-6.9 
(2018). 
New Mexico Yes Yes No N.M. CODE R. § 8.26.4.13(L)(7) 
(LexisNexis 2018). 
New York No No No N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 18, § 443.3 (2018). 
North 
Carolina 
Yes Yes (Locked) No 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 
70E.1110 (2018). 
North Dakota Yes Yes No N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-03-14-03 
(2018). 
Ohio Yes Yes (Locked) No OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:2-7-
12(F) (2018). 
Oklahoma Yes No No OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:110-
5-60(b)(3) (2018). 
Oregon No No No OR. ADMIN. R. 413-215-0318 
(2018). 
Pennsylvania No No No None Specific to Firearms 
Rhode Island Yes Yes (Locked) No 214-40 R.I. CODE R. § 3.7.2(E) 
(LexisNexis 2018).  







No No S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 
114-550(H)(18) (2018). 
South Dakota Yes Yes No S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:42:05:20 
(2018). 
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes TENN. DEP’T OF CHILD. SERVS., 
ADMIN. POL’S & PROCS.: 16.4, 
FOSTER HOME SELECTION AND 
APPROVAL G(7)(b) (2018). 
Texas Yes Yes (Locked) No 26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 749.2961 (2018). 
Utah Yes Yes (Locked) No UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 501-12-
7(6) (2018). 
Vermont Yes Yes (Locked) No 13-7 VT. ADMIN. CODE R. 
§ 40.407 (2018). 
Virginia Yes Yes (Locked) No 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-211-
70(J)(2) (2018). 
Washington Yes Yes (unless 
in safe made 
for firearms) 
No WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 110-148-1500 (2018). 
West Virginia Yes No No W. VA. CODE R. § 78-2-15.6 
(2018). 
Wisconsin Yes Yes (Locked) No WIS. ADMIN. CODE DCF 
§ 56.08(5) (2018). 
Wyoming Yes Yes (Locked) No 049-0029-3 WYO. CODE R. 
§ 18(k) (LexisNexis 2018). 
 
